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I.

Introduction and Overview of the Argument.

After any significant corporate scandal, expect lawyers to be blamed. In the case of the
collapse of Enron, there is plenty of blame to go around.1 The board of directors failed to
exercise effective oversight; some corporate officers engaged in blatant self-dealing while others
overlooked obvious conflicts of interest; investors and corporate officers unduly emphasized
short-term earnings at the expense of the long-term viability of businesses, partially because of
the importance of equity-based compensation for senior management; in-house and retained
accountants blessed the dubious accounting treatment of multiple transactions; in addition to
engaging in outright malfeasance, the company made some lousy business decisions, such as

1

For journalistic accounts of the Enron fiasco and the various explanations for it, see B E T HA N Y M C L E A N &
P ETER E L KIN D , T HE S MARTEST G UYS IN THE R O O M : T HE A MAZING R IS E AN D S CANDALOUS F ALL OF E N R O N (2003);
L O R E N F O X , E N R O N : T HE R IS E AN D F ALL (2003); M IM I S WA RTZ & S H E R RO N W A T KIN S , P OWER F AILURE: T HE I N S ID E
S TORY OF THE C OLLAPSE O F E N R O N (2003). For reports of official investigations, see the First, Second, and Third
Interim Reports and the [Fourth and] Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner (dated Sept. 21, 2002;
Jan. 21, 2003, June 30, 2003, and Nov. 4, 2003, respectively) [hereinafter “First, Second, Third, and Fourth Batson
Report,” respectively]; Report of the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Feb.
1, 2002) [hereinafter “Powers Report”]; Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee
on G overnmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, The R ole of the B oard of Directors in E nron’s Collapse, 107th Cong., Report
107-70 (July 8, 2002) [hereinafter “Senate Investigations Subcommittee Report”]. All of these documents are
available on-line, from va rious sources includ ing the FindLaw library of Enro n-related documents,
<http://news.findlaw.co m/legalnews/lit/enron/#doc uments> (visited 12/9/0 3), the e-Law re pository of documents
from U.S. bankruptcy court, <http://bank.elaw.com> (visited 12/9/03), or from Enron’s own website,
<http://www.enron.com/c orp/por/supporting.html> (visited 12/9/0 3). Fo r scholarly analysis, see Jo hn C. Coffee, Jr.,
What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 COR NE LL L. R EV . 269 (2004)
[hereinafter, “Coffee, What Caused Enron”]; E. N orman V easey, Corporate G overnance and Ethics in a P ostEnron/Worldcom Environment, 72 U. C IN . L. R EV . 731 (2004); Symp osium , Crisis in C onfid ence: Co rporate
Governance and Professional Ethics Post-Enron, 35 CO N N . L. R EV . 915 (2003); Symp osium , On Enron, Worldcom,
and Their Afterm ath, 27 V T . L. R EV . 817 (2003); Symp osium , Lessons from Enron: How Did Corporate and
Securities Law Fail?, 48 V ILL. L. R EV . 989 (2003); Symp osium , Lesso ns from Enron: A Symposium on C orporate
Governance, 54 M ERCER L. R EV . 663 (2003); Douglas G . Baird & Robert K . Rasm ussen, Fou r (or Five) Ea sy
Lessons from Enron, 55 V A N D . L. R EV . 178 7 (2002 ); Symp osium, Enron: Lessons and Implications, 8 STAN . J. L.
B U S . & F IN . 1 (20 02); W illiam W . Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 T U L. L. R EV . 1275
(2002) [hereinafter, “B ratton, Dark Side”]; Jeffrey N. G ordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control
of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. C H I. L. R EV . 1233 (2002); Steven L.
Schw arcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. C IN . L. R EV .
130 9 (2002 ) [hereinafter, “Schwarcz, Use a nd A buse”].

1

investing in broadband capacity when there was already an oversupply; many Wall Street
analysts were too busy trying to drum up business for their investment banker employers to
exercise objective judgment; Enron’s auditor’s independence was compromised by the massive
fees it earned from the client, and from cross-selling consulting services; and investors were so
besotted with “new economy” hype that they failed to use common sense when investing in
companies with no obvious way of making money.2 Even with this apparent surfeit of careless or
malevolent actors, however, the legal profession should expect to be called upon to justify the
role of lawyers in the transactions that ultimately proved to be Enron’s undoing. Lawyers played

2

See F O X , supra note 1, at 193-95, 241, 269 (analysts acting as cheerleaders because of conflicts);
M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra note 1 , at 317 -18, 3 24 (And ersen’s indep endence com promised ); Coffee, What Caused
Enron, supra note 1, at 292 (explaining SEC disclosure requirements for firing auditor vs. firing consulting firm,
which further co mpromise d aud itor independence); F ox, supra note 1, at 241-43 (credulity of investors, illustrated
by hed ge fund mana gers wh o saw red flags in Enron’s accounting and sold its stock short); S WA RTZ & W A T KIN S ,
supra note 1, at xi-xiii, 331 (credulity of investors, illustrated by Houston financial advisor who did not recommend
Enron stock because he couldn’t make sense of its financial statements and W arren Buffet’s statement that he never
unde rstood how Enron m ade money); Baird & Rasm ussen, supra note 1, at 1809 (investors failed to understand that
Enron’s business m ode l was vulnerable to co mpe tition); F O X , supra note 1, at 195 (dot-com “bubble” of unjustified
optim ism by investors); M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra note 1, at 231-33, 299 (during the late 1990’s bull market
analysts and investors w ere obsessed with short-term earnings targets and prone to hype); B ratton, Dark Side, supra
note 1 , at 128 3-84 (maximizing shareh older value has co me to mean fixation on sho rt-term numbe rs); Co ffee, What
Caused Enron, supra note 1, at 293-95 (noting that gatekeepers’ reputational capital is less valuable in a market
bub ble); Fox, supra note 1, at 211-13, 229-30 (Arthur Andersen’s acquiescence in SPE transactions); Powers
Rep ort, supra note 1, at 5, 24-25 (same); F O X , supra note 1, at 123-27, 151-56, 160, 228 (self-dealing by Andrew
Fastow and Michael Koppe r); Po wers R epo rt, supra note 1 , at 7-9, 1 6, 18 , 26 (sa me); M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra
note 1 , at 196 -211 (same ); id. at 190 (Andersen’s skepticism about Enron dealing with private investment funds
controlled by Fastow); F ourth Batson R epo rt, supra note 1, at 58-59 (Fastow’s personal dealing and failure by Lay
and Skilling to inquire); F O X , supra note 1 , at 169 , 176 (Kenneth Lay’s “hands-off” m anagement style); but see
Fourth Batson Rep ort, supra note 1 , at 57-5 8 (La y was actively enga ged in monitoring); F O X , supra note 1, at 15859, 3 09 (inattention of bo ard); but see Powers R epo rt, supra note 1, at 9 (board’s approval of LJM transactions was
with kno wledge of conflicts of interest); Senate Investiga tions Subcomm ittee Report, supra note 1, at 11-15 (claims
of ignorance of bo ard m emb ers not borne out b y evidence, but board m ay have been unduly defere ntial to co rporate
officers); M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra note 1, at 126-27, 22 7-28 (E nron was o bsessed with booking ea rnings,
particularly through mark-to-m arket accounting, but wasn’t particularly conc erned about cash flo w); F O X , supra note
1, at 281-82 (Lay conceding that certain investments had performed poorly and the company had accumulated a
great d eal of d ebt); M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra note 1, at xxiv (Skilling admitting that the broadband venture, which
lost $1 billion, was a bad idea); id. at 225-27 (bad investments and mana gement in trad ing business); F O X , supra
note 1, at 307 (investing in bandwidth trading was a terrible idea in light of overcapacity in telecommunications
industry); Baird & Rasm ussen, supra note 1, at 1798-99 (Enron was a “toxic” combination of market-making and
venture cap ital busine sses).

2

a substantial role in every one of the transactions that were ultimately restated in October 2001,
by advising their client, documenting the deals, and certifying their compliance with various legal
requirements. When Enron announced that it was taking hundreds of millions of dollars of
charges against earnings, and announced that it was reducing shareholders’ equity by over a
billion dollars, its trading business collapsed as counterparties refused to deal with the company
on credit.3 Lawyers were the but-for cause of these restatements of earnings, and therefore of the
subsequent failure of what was once the seventh largest publicly traded company in the United
States, because the transactions could not have closed in their original form without the
approvals of lawyers.4 The pressing question for the legal profession is whether they were
additionally the responsible cause, in the sense of bearing moral blameworthiness for approving
the transactions that ultimately had to be restated.

When the last scandal of this magnitude — the savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s —
became widely known, a federal judge famously asked “Where were the lawyers?”5 Judge
Sporkin’s cri de coeur has become a convenient shorthand used by scholars of the legal
profession who believe, as I do, that lawyers have failed to take seriously their responsibility as

3

For the size of the restatements, charges against earnings, and reductions in shareholder equity, see
Powers R eport, supra note 1 , at 2-3; Second B atson Rep ort, supra note 1, at 6-9. For the unraveling of SPE
transac tions, see Schw arcz, Use a nd A buse, supra note 1 , at 131 0-11 . For the reluctance o f others to trade with
Enron and the resulting crisis in cash flow, see F O X , supra note 1 , at 264 , 268 ; S WA RTZ & W A T KIN S , supra note 1, at
328 -32; M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra note 1 , at 236 , 378 -80; B ratton, Dark Side, supra note 1, at 1310.
4

See Seco nd B atson Rep ort, supra note 1 , at 5 n.8 (pre-b ankruptcy size of Enron); F ourth Batson R epo rt,
supra note 1 , at 114 (attorneys pro vided essential role in clo sing transactions).
5

Linco ln Sav. & Lo an Ass’n v. W all, 743 F. Sup p. 90 1, 92 0 (D .D.C . 199 0); see also Susan P. Koniak,
Testimony, Where Were the Lawyers? Behind the Curtain Wearing Their Magic Caps, in Accountability Issues:
Lessons Learned from Enron’s Fall — Se nate Judiciary Committee Hearing (Feb. 6, 2002) (ironically echoing Judge
Sporkin’s question).

3

professionals while representing wealthy corporate clients. It may be the case that lawyers have
not yet been subjected to the kind of grilling at the hands of Congressional investigators that
officers like Lay and Skilling had to endure,6 and certainly no law firm has suffered the fate of
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, which was convicted of obstruction of justice for attempting
to thwart an SEC investigation.7 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ask the hard questions about
the role of lawyers in the most recent wave of corporate scandals. This Article is not a polemic
against the rotten state of lawyers’ ethics. It is probably true to some extent that “[p]erverse
incentives, not declines in ethics, cause scandals.”8 When it comes to the role of lawyers,
however, it is impossible to talk about incentives — perverse or otherwise — without having a
very clear jurisprudential understanding of how lawyers ought to apply and interpret complex,
ambiguous legal norms to their clients’ transactions. In particular, we ought to investigate the
responsibility of lawyers, acting in their capacity of representatives of clients, vis-à-vis the
maintenance of a stable framework of legal norms. Do lawyers have any such responsibility, or
may they take a merely instrumental stance toward the law, treating it as something that may be
evaded or nullified through careful planning? If the technical requirements of law can be evaded
to the client’s benefit and the detriment of others, is there anything in the lawyer’s role that

6

Susan P. K oniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 CO LU M . L. R EV .
123 6, 123 7 (2003) (“the lawyers have, however, largely escaped responsibility for their role in this nation’s latest
spate of corporate fraud”).
7

See B ARBARA L E Y T OFFLER & J ENNIFER R EING OLD , F INAL A C C O U N TIN G : A M B IT IO N , G REED , A N D
F ALL OF A RTHUR A NDERSEN 221 -22 (2 003 ); M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra note 1 , at 406 -07.
8

T HE

Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note 1 , at 278 ; see also Do nald C . Langevoort, The Organizational
Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV .
968 (2002) (discussing cognitive psychological research on the production of firm cultures that tend to create a
dispo sition on the part of managers to blo ck out distracting concerns, like ethical issues); B ratton, Dark Side, supra
note 1, at 1329-32 (arguing that the most plausible story of Enron’s fall requires understanding the workplace
“tournament” culture, which created a bias toward winning and an inability to perceive reality accurately).
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prohibits her from assisting the client?

In this Article, I wish to defend what I call the interpretive attitude of professionalism.9
In short, professionalism is a stance toward the law which accepts that a lawyer is not simply an
agent of her client (although the lawyer-client relationship is obviously governed by the law of
agency). Rather, in carrying out her client’s lawful instructions, a lawyer has an obligation to
apply the law to her client’s situation with due regard to the substantive meaning of legal norms,
not merely their formal expression.10 In addition, a professional lawyer must respect the

9

A reade r may be forgiven for thinking that we need another de fense of professionalism like she needs a
hole in the head. Certainly the rheto ric of professionalism is a cliché in the self-justifying discourse of the legal
profession an d in academic criticism of the conduct of the bar. Professionalism is a wo rd that has been used by so
many different theorists, for so many different purposes, that it is almost devoid of meaning. For example,
sociologists and economists in a debunking mode observe the tendency of the organized body of lawyers to erect
barriers to entry and consolidate its control over the provision of anything that could conceivably be called legal
service s, in order to en joy monopoly re nts. See, e.g., E LLIOTT A. K RAUSE , D EATH OF THE G U IL DS : P R O FE S SIO N S ,
S TATES , AND THE A DVA NCE O F C APITALISM , 1930 TO THE P R E SE N T (1996); R IC H A R D A. P OSNER , O VERCOMING L AW
39-6 0 (1996 ); R IC H A R D L. A BEL , A M E R IC A N L AWYERS 17-30 (1989). Idealistic critics of lawyers contrast
professiona lism with the profit motive, and castigate greedy lawyers fo r ruining a forme rly hono rable pursuit. See,
e.g., R U D O LP H J. G ERBER , L AWYERS , C OURTS , A N D P R O FE SS IO N ALIS M 23 (1989) (“To day we have lost the ab ility to
distinguish between a calling and a station in life, to see differences between a profession and a trade. To the extent
that law students and lawyers become absorbed in status and gain, law ceases to be a profession . . ..”); Tom C.
Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SA N D IE G O L. R EV . 249 , 251 (1975) (“the primacy of service ove r profit is
the criterion which distinguishes a profession from a business”). A more positive notion of professionalism, drawing
from the work of sociologists such as Em elie Durkheim and Talcott Parson s as well as from the legal the ory of Louis
D. Brandeis, emphasizes the lawyer’s independence from the client and imagines the lawyer as a mediator between
the client’s and the public’s interests. See, e.g., Rob ert L. N elson & D avid M . Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism:
The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in L AWYERS ’ I DE ALS /L AWYERS ’ P RACTICES: T R A N SF O RM A T IO N S
IN THE A M E R IC A N L EGA L P R O FE S SIO N 180 (Robert L. Nelson, et al., eds., 1992); Robert W. Gordon & William H.
Simo n, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in id. at 215; W illiam H . Simo n, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of
the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN . L. R EV . 565 (1985). This latter definition approximates the conception of
professiona lism that I will defend here.
10

Compa re the principle of dynamic statutory interpretation, which requires an interpreter to construe a text
“in light of [its] present social, political, and legal context.” W illiam N . Eskrid ge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. P A . L. R EV . 147 9 (1987 ) [hereinafter, “E skridge, Dynam ic”]. It is also similar to the principle of
purp osivism , familiar in leg al ethics fro m the work o f William Sim on and D avid W ilkins. See David B. W ilkins,
Lega l Realism for Law yers, 104 H ARV . L. R EV . 468 , 505 -15 (1 990 ); W illiam H . Simo n, The Ideology of Advocacy,
1978 W IS . L. R EV . 29, 62. Differences with these approaches will be apparent in the application of the attitude of
professiona lism to ca ses.

5

achievement represented by law, which is the final settlement of contested issues (both factual
and normative) with a view toward enabling coordinated action in a highly complex, pluralistic
society. This obligation of respect means that a lawyer must treat legal norms as preclusive of
the moral and other reasons that would otherwise justify or require a different action in the
circumstances.11 We can call this the negative aspect of the attitude of professionalism, which
has a further, positive, aspect. The positive aspect is the demand that a lawyer should take a
certain attitude toward the law, manifesting her recognition that the law is worthy of being taken
seriously, interpreted in good faith with due regard to its substantive meaning, and not simply
seen as an obstacle standing in the way of the client’s goals.12 Law is an achievement, but not
one that will persist without custodians and defenders. It is the job of lawyers to maintain this
institution in good working order, instead of subverting it.13 As Jeremy Waldron puts it, any
attempt to circumvent the law should be accompanied by feelings of distaste and dishonor,14 not

11

For a more elab orate defense of this position, see W . Bradley W endel, Civil Obedience, 104 CO LU M . L.
R EV . 363 (2004).
12

See S T E VE N J. B U R T O N, J U D G IN G IN G O O D F AITH 17, 35-37, and passim (1992); Tho mas D. M organ &
Robert W . Tuttle, Leg al Re prese ntation in a Pluralist So ciety, 63 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV . 984 (1995); Rob ert W .
Go rdon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CO N N . L. R EV . 1185, 1200 (2003)
[hereinafter, “G ordon, New Role”] (“[T]he re is a difference between trying to game and manip ulate a system as a
resistance movement or alienated outsider would, and to engage in a committed and good faith struggle within the
system to influence it to fulfill what a go od faith interpreter wo uld co nstrue as its best values and purp oses.”).
13

See Robert W . Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar’s Response to Kaye Scholer, 23 LA W &
S O C . I NQUIRY 315 (1998) (“Lawyers have, I think, fallen into the habit of thinking that maintaining the integrity of
the legal framework is always someone else’s problem . . .. But, of course, the order of rules and norms, policies and
procedures, and institutional actors and roles that make up the legal system . . . is only as effective as voluntary
compliance can make it; for if people routinely start running red lights when they think no cop is watching (or hire
lawyers to keep a lookout for the cops, and to exhaust the resources of traffic courts arguing the lights were green),
the regime will collapse.”). The obligation on the part of lawyers to maintain the institution of law can be
unde rstood as an instance of the R awlsian natural duty to suppo rt just institutions. See J O H N R AW LS , A T H E O R Y O F
J USTICE 114-17, 333 -37 (19 71). Fo r a defense of the Rawlsian position, which is sometimes thought to be less
plausible than it is, see Jere my W aldro n, Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 P H IL . & P U B . A FF . 3 (1993).
14

J E R EM Y W A LD R O N , L A W

AND

D IS A GR E EM E N T 101 (1999).

6

pride for having defeated something that is regarded as an adversary. In addition, respect for the
law demands that lawyers be able to provide public, reasoned justification for an interpretation of
legal texts — one which is plausible in light of the underlying purposes of the statutes, rules, or
cases.

Professionalism stands in opposition to the view of many lawyers that excellence in
lawyering means engaging in “creative and aggressive” structuring of transactions for the benefit
of clients, even though the transactions are set up to evade regulatory requirements for the
protection of investors. The quoted language, “creative and aggressive,” which is often used by
lawyers as a term of approbation, comes from the report issued by Enron’s long-time outside
counsel, Vinson & Elkins, in response to the concerns raised by Sherron Watkins.15 The firm,
investigating transactions its own lawyers had worked on, despite the glaring conflicts of
interest,16 determined that the only problem with the structure and accounting treatment of the
transactions was potentially one of public relations. The subtext of this response was that
creativity and aggressiveness is a positive value in sophisticated business counsel. Interestingly,

15

See F O X , supra note 1 , at 259 ; Jill E. Fisch & K enneth M . Rosen, Is There a Role for La wyers in
Preven ting Fu ture En rons?, 48 V ILL. L. R EV . 1097, 1115 (2003). Sherron Watkins was a vice-president for
corporate development in the finance department of Enron at the time she wrote a letter to Kenneth Lay warning that
the company might “implode in a wave of accounting scandals.” See F O X , supra note 1, at 247-48; Fourth Batson
Rep ort, supra note 1, Ap p. C at 15 9-61. T he com plete W atkins letter is available on-line from numerous sites,
including Find Law, and is inc luded as an appe ndix to her book. See Letter Purportedly From Enron Employee
Sherron W atkins Sent T o Enron Chairman and C .E.O . Ken neth Lay Re: Enro n Accounting Practices, in S WA RTZ &
W A T KIN S , supra note 1, at 361-62; <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf> (visited
12/9 /03).
16
Roger C. C ramto n, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 B U S .
L AW . 143 (2002); Fourth Batson Rep ort, supra note 1 , at 50 & App . C at 161-6 6; Powers Report, supra note 1, at
176-77 (“T he result of the V&E review was largely predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and
the proce ss employed . . . . The scope and pro cess of the investigation app ear to have b een structured with less
skepticism than was needed to see thro ugh these particularly co mplex transactions.”).

7

Watkins’ letter itself used the word “aggressive” to describe the company’s accounting, but the
word had a decidedly more negative connotation for her — suggesting that Enron had used
smoke and mirrors to obscure the economic substance of transactions to the point that the
accounting treatment was no longer reliable.17 The concluding section of this Article will
therefore be devoted to analyzing, as concisely as possible, a couple of the transactions which
Enron allegedly used to manipulate its financial statements, move debt off its balance sheet to
artificially prop up its credit rating, and meet ambitious short-term earnings forecasts.

It is relatively easy to say, in the abstract, that lawyers should not be “too aggressive” or
should exercise judgment with due regard to the public interest, but I hope to show that these
general standards of professionalism have content when applied to actual transactions that fall
within the zone of professional judgment. In many of the Enron transactions, an attitude of
professionalism would have required the lawyers to refuse to issue opinion letters in transactions
which arguably, technically, “aggressively” complied with formal legal rules, but where the clear
intent of regulators was not to permit them to occur in that form.18 In other words, a lawyer
would be required to prevent the kind of abuse that is colorfully illustrated by a former Enron
employee:

17

See Powers R epo rt, supra note 1 , at 4-5 (stating co mmittee’s con clusion that certain related -party
transac tions lacked econ omic substance and we re entered into solely for the purpose of manipulating Enron’s
financial statements).
18
See W illiam W . Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus
Ren ts, 48 V ILL. L. R EV . 1023, 1044 (2003) (distinguishing regulatory arbitrage from strategic noncompliance, and
defining the latter as “action under an interpretation of the law in conflict with the stated interpretation of the
regulator”).
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Say you have a dog, but you need to create a duck on the financial statements.
Fortunately, there are specific accounting rules for what constitutes a duck:
yellow feet, white covering, orange beak. So you take the dog and paint its feet
yellow and its fur white and you paste an orange plastic beak on its nose, and then
you say to your accountants, “This is a duck! Don’t you agree that it’s a duck?”
And the accountants say, “Yes, according to the rules, this is a duck.” Everybody
knows that it’s a dog, not a duck, but that doesn’t matter, because you’ve met the
rules for calling it a duck.19

It is not surprising that the rules of financial accounting would have criteria for duck-ness, but a
point often escapes non-lawyers about the nature of rule-based reasoning: No matter how clear a
rule appears to be, it will always be ambiguous enough to be manipulable, unless the rule is
backstopped by a more substantive legal norm, cast in the form of a standard or principle that is
to be applied using the informed judgment of a decisionmaker.20 Professionalism, in a nutshell,
instructs lawyers not to participate in the hocus-pocus of turning dogs into ducks, and is therefore
a principle for regulating the exercise of interpretive judgment.

This Article attempts to accomplish two somewhat disparate tasks: first, to argue for a
theory of interpretation that is a function of a particular account of the nature and authority of
law, and second to apply this theory to an actual lawyering dilemma, considered in enough detail
to make it realistic. It will engage with jurisprudential questions at a fairly high level of
abstraction, but also show how these theoretical arguments can shed light on the ethical problems

19

Qu oted in M C L E A N & E L KIN D , supra note 1, at 142-43.

20

See Schw arcz, Use a nd A buse, supra note 1, at 1309 (due to the complexity of structured-finance
transactions, “the company’s investors must rely, to some extent, on the business judgment of management”).
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that lawyers encounter in practice.21 Even fairly esoteric issues in legal theory, like the
Hart/Dworkin debate, can have significant practical implications for lawyers and critics of the
profession, but abstract jurisprudential arguments are seldom brought to bear directly on complex
real world problems. This fusion may appear quixotic at first, but I hope the Article supports my
hypothesis that by considering jurisprudential issues in the context of actual cases we can make
progress understanding both the theory of legal ethics and the kinds of ethical dilemmas
encountered in practice by sophisticated transactional lawyers.

A schematic overview of the Article is as follows: The argument begins in Section II by
considering the attitude of professionalism in contrast with the prevalent view that lawyers may
take a purely instrumental attitude toward law, treating it as merely an obstacle or an
inconvenience to be planned around, rather than a source of normativity that is legitimate. The
jurisprudential heavy lifting comes in Section III, which considers conceptual arguments about
the nature of law and the relationship between legal and moral norms, as well as the problem of
objectivity in legal interpretation. Section IV makes these abstract arguments more concrete, by
making the descriptive point that analogues to the professional attitude are very much a feature of
legal reasoning, and by giving a normative argument that the stance of professionalism ought to
be a part of legal reasoning. Finally, Section V applies this theory of lawyers’ ethics to some of
the transactions that played a role in the collapse of Enron, showing the ways in which we can
21

Cf. Robert W . Gordon & W illiam H . Simo n, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in L AWYERS ’
I DE ALS /L AWYERS ’ P RACTICES: T RANSFORMATIONS IN THE A M E R IC A N L EGA L P R O FE S SIO N 238 (Robert L. Nelson, et
al., eds., 1992) (“The task of applying jurisprudence to the lawyering role is relatively undeveloped and should be on
the agenda of teachers of professional respo nsibility.”); B U R T O N, supra note ___, at xv-xvi (setting out a theory of
adjudication that is practical, in the sense that it does not take a third-party observer’s perspective on judging, but
says som ething about how a judge should actually dec ide cases).
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criticize the lawyers for having engaged in faulty legal reasoning.

II.

Professionalism vs. the Holmesian Bad Man Stance.

The principal target of my argument is the position that lawyers are permitted to take a
“Holmesian bad man” interpretive attitude toward legal norms, regarding them as obstacles to be
planned around, or even costs to be incurred in the course of pursuing one’s client’s projects.22
Holmes defined the law in terms only of a prediction about how legal officials might decide
particular cases, which he illustrated through the metaphor of a “bad man” who is interested only
in avoiding legal penalties that might attach to his conduct. The problem with the perspective of
the bad man is not that it is descriptively inaccurate — surely many people, including lawyers, do
care about the law only insofar as it might impose sanctions on them — but that it is
jurisprudentially unsatisfying. The bad man’s perspective is only one of many standpoints that
one may adopt toward the law,23 and it is far from self-evident that it is the best perspective to
employ when describing the relationship between lawyers and the law. The choice of an
interpretive standpoint is a normative one, and there must be an argument for why one ought to
adopt the perspective of the bad man, if that perspective is to do any justifying work in
jurisprudence. As Ronald Dworkin rightly observes, a participant in a social practice does not
regard the practice and its constitutive rules as simply given, but assumes it has some value, in

22

See Oliver W endell Ho lmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 H ARV . L. R EV . 457 , 459 -62 (1 897 ).

23

See W illiam T wining, The Bad M an Revisited, 58 COR NE LL L. R EV . 275 (1973).
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the sense of serving some interest or purpose.24 The focus of a theory of lawyering must
therefore be on the purpose of the legal system and, correspondingly, the point of having
officially licensed and regulated lawyers who represent clients in connection with matters
requiring legal advice, judgment, and skill.25 The argument must be “normative all the way
down,” with a theory of democracy justifying a theory of the function of law, which in turn
justifies a conception of the lawyer’s role.

Whenever lawyers face serious criticism from regulators or academics for their role in
client malfeasance, they usually defend themselves and their extremely narrow interpretive
attitude by appealing to the lawyer-client relationship and their duties as fiduciaries of clients.
Their duties, say the lawyers, are limited to protecting client interests by providing competent
representation and keeping secrets, and most certainly do not include serving as gatekeepers or

24

R O N A LD D W O RKIN , L AW ’S E MPIRE 47 (1986). Dworkin uses the term “the interpretive attitud e” to
describe the standp oint of p articipa nts in a practice w ho seek to im pose som e meaning o n the practice, and to see it
in its best light. Id. at 46-48. In this Article I will make a more general reference to plural interpretive attitudes,
which need not necessarily be identical with Dworkin’s constructive interpretation theory of law. The reason for
making this distinction is that I believe Dworkin is right in taking seriously the perspective of participants in a social
practice, or tho se who take what Ha rt calls an internal point of view toward the rules of a prac tice. See H.L.A. H ART ,
T HE C ON CEPT O F L AW 56, 88-91 (2d ed. 1994). Dworkin’s use of the singular term “interpretive attitude” is too
strong, however, because people governed by the rules of certain complex social practices may be able to adopt one
of seve ral reasonable stances tow ard the rules — e.g. attitude s of resistance, ca utious acquiescence, enthusiastic
embrace, and so on. The attitude one takes toward the rules is a significant jurisprudential question, and because I
disagree with some aspects of D workin’s theory of law, it is imp ortant to note this terminological distinction.
25
Cf. Cass R . Sunstein & A drian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 M ICH . L. R EV . 885 (2003)
(recommending that theories of interpretation take into account the institutional competence of the interpreter);
Joseph R az, The Problem About the Nature of Law, in E THICS IN THE P UBLIC D OMAIN 195, 203 -05 (1994) (arguing
against taking a narrow “lawyer’s perspective,” which eliminates co nsideration o f the lawyer’s relationship with
other institutions such as courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and various intermediate associations).
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quasi-regulators of their clients’ transactions.26 This defense misses the point, however, that the
lawyer-client relationship is itself created by the legal system and imposes duties on lawyers to
the extent (and only to the extent) those duties are justified by the social function of the law.
Lawyers are not judges, who are institutionally charged with the task of remaining impartial, but
they are also not clients, who may be permitted to approach the law from a partisan and selfinterested perspective. The role of lawyer is something of an amalgam of the judge’s and client’s
roles, serving as a bridge between the biased position of clients and the ideally neutral position of
judges.27 Lawyers are fiduciaries, but not only caretakers of their clients’ interests — they are
also custodians of the law in an important sense.28 Thus, they have a responsibility to build the
interests of third parties into their interpretation of law, even when working on behalf of private

26

See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra note _ __, at ___ ; Evan Da vis, The Meaning of Professional
Independence, 103 CO LU M . L. R EV . 128 1 (2003 ); Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron: Media Frenzy and
Misg uided Notion s of Pu blic Relation s are n o Reaso n to A ban don our C om mitm ent to Ou r Clien ts, 2003 U. I LL. L.
R EV . 124 3-12 59 (200 3); James A . Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization of “Officer of the
Court”, 48 B UFF . L. R EV . 349 (2000); Ame rican B ar Ass’n, Statement of Policy Regarding Responsibilities and
Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 B U S . L AW . 545 (1975); Comments of 79 Law Firms on Proposed SEC
Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Apr. 7. 2003), at 2, available at
<www.sec.govrules/pro posed/s7 450 2/79 lawfirms1.htm> (visited 12/1 8/03 ) (“An attorney to an issuer . . . is ethically
bound to act as a legal counselor to, and at times an advocate for, that issuer, is not independent or required to be,
and only in very limited circumstances provides advice that may be relied on by the investing public.”). Harry
Reasoner, the managing partne r of Vinson & Elkins, o ne of E nron’s princip al outsid e law firms, defended his firm’s
conduct in similar term s, punting respo nsibility for ensuring that transactions had ec onomic sub stance to Enron’s
acco untants. “T here is a misund erstand ing of wh at outsid e cou nsel’s role is,” he said. “W e would have no role in
determining whethe r, or what, acco unting treatment was appropriate.” Jo hn Schwartz, Enron’s Many Strands: The
Law yers: Trou bling Q uestions A head for Enro n’s Law Firm, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 12, 200 2), at C1. For a thorough
analysis of the tension between competing conceptions of the lawyers role which came to a head over the National
Student Marketing case, see Simon Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and
Professional Ethics, 76 M ICH . L. R EV . 423 (1978 ).
27
Rob ert W . Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, in T HE N E W H IG H P RIESTS : L A W Y E R S IN P OST C IVIL W AR A MERICA 51 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed. 1984). This hybrid role has long been accepted as a description of
the duties of a prosec utor. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate P ursuit, 68 FO R DH A M L. R EV . 1695 (200 0).
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clients. Although lawyers usually become almost apoplectic at the suggestion that they have any
responsibility toward the legal system or the law as such, the contrary position that lawyers can
approach the law like Holmes’s bad men, is impossible to justify at the level of an institutionsensitive theory of law and lawyering.

A.

Rational Instrumentalism?

Contemporary defenders of the Holmesian bad man interpretive attitude often identify
with the law and economics movement.29 Of course, an affinity for law and economics does not
make one pro-Enron; indeed, sophisticated neoclassical economic theory may even support
something like the attitude of professionalism. As Kenneth Arrow points out, contracts, markets,
and transactions depend on relationships of trust and confidence.30 It is impossible to draft
contracts with sufficient specificity to handle every situation that could conceivably arise in the
course of a commercial relationship. Thus, the parties depend on one another not to behave
opportunistically. “Every contract depends for its observance on a mass of unspecified

29

See, e.g., Frank H. E asterbrook & D aniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targe ts of Tende r Offers, 80
M ICH . L. R EV . 1155 , 1177 n.57 (19 82) (“ma nagers do not have an ethical duty to obey econom ic regulatory laws just
because the laws exist. They must determine the importance of those laws. The penalties Congress names for
disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal
sanctio ns is based on the sup position that m anagers not only ma y but also should violate the rules when it is
profitable to do so .”). Cynthia W illiams uses the term “law-as-price” conception to label this interpretive attitude.
See Cynthia A. W illiams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. R EV . 1265, 1267
(1998). The law-as-price theory is somewhat different, because it expands the Holmesian bad man predictive
orientation toward law into a distinctive theory of entitlement. According to law-as-price, one has a right to violate
the law which can be obtained simply by “purchasing” the associated penalty, or willingly incurring a risk of the
penalty. Id. at 1268. This difference is immaterial for the purposes of this Article, because both the Holmesian bad
man predictive account of law and the law-as-price theory of entitlement are predicated on the same jurisprudential
error, which I will discuss in detail here.
30

Ken neth J. A rrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 P U B . P O L’Y 303, 314 (1973).
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conditions which suggest that performance will be carried out in good faith without insistence on
sticking literally to its wording.”31 In relational contracting, the parties rely on the repeated
nature of their interactions to safeguard against opportunistic behavior.32 A similar dynamic
limits dishonesty in small communities where the participants may encounter one another in a
future commercial relationship and where information about misconduct can be inexpensively
disseminated.33 In one-shot interactions in larger and more impersonal communities, the parties
must use a different mechanism to ensure against exploitation; in this case economic theory uses
the concept of lawyers as reputational intermediaries to explain why a lawyer or law firm would
avoid being too aggressive in structuring transactions.34 The services of gatekeepers, such as
transactional lawyers and auditing firms, signal to the market that the client’s representations are
fair and accurate. Gatekeepers can perform this function because their principal stock in trade is
a reputation for probity, built up over years of “vouching” for clients by representing them in
transactions. A gatekeeper firm would squander this reputation by vouching for a client whose

31

Id. at 314.
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Stuart M acaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM . S O C . R EV . 55

(1963).
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See, e.g., Lisa B ernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 M ICH . L. R EV . 172 4 (2001 ); Lisa B ernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System : Extralegal Con tractual Relations in the D iamo nd Industry, 21 J. L EG . S T U D . 115 (1992); David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 H ARV . L. R EV . 373 (1990 ).
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See, e.g., Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note ___, at 279-97; Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R.
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Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. E C O N . & O RG . 53 (1986); Ronald J.
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representations were dishonest, so its association with a client is a credible signal of the client’s
honesty. Because gatekeepers have less to gain from dishonesty than clients do, they have a
powerful incentive to monitor the client’s conduct for dishonesty, to avoid losing valuable
credibility. In effect the gatekeeper becomes a quasi-regulator, ensuring that deals are reached on
the basis of accurate information.

Nevertheless, the relational-contracting and gatekeeper ideas still concede something
significant to the Holmesian bad man model, namely their bleak vision of professionals as
essentially self-interested, amorally pragmatic actors who take a purely instrumental approach to
the law.35 In the economic vision of professional ethics, the reasons for following the law (or
being honest in contractual relationships) can be reduced to one simple motivation — the fear of
sanctions.36 Sanctions may come in the form of official, state-imposed punishments or nonlegal
penalties such as the loss of business opportunities, but in any event the avoidance of sanctions is
the sole reason any actor would have to refrain from exploiting other parties in a transaction or
treating legal rules as inconveniences to be planned around. As Holmes so memorably put it, this
attitude toward the law “stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much

35

See Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics, an d Classica l Realism, in T HE P ATH OF THE L A W
I NFLUENCE : T HE L EGACY OF O LIVER W EN DE LL H OLMES , J R . 285 (Steven J. Burton ed. 2000 ).
36
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Cf. Ho lmes, supra note ___, at 462 (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it — and nothing else.”). The instrumental attitude toward law may be
chara cterized, in jurisp rudential terms, as reducing conduct rules to decision ru les. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 H ARV . L. R EV . 625 (1984 ). Rules are
analytically separable into two categories: conduct rules which are addressed to individuals and which permit or
forbid certain actions, and d ecision rules which are addressed to officials and regulate the act of passing judgm ent.
Although these categories are conceptually distinct, it is possible to run them together in practice, and conceive of
conduct rules as b eing entirely a functio n of de cision ru les. See id. at 632. The Holmesian bad man attitude focuses
interpretation solely on decision rules — i.e. when will a judge determine that I have violated the law? The attitude
prescribed by professionalism focuses interpretation on conduct rules — i.e. what does the law require?
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ethics into the law as they can.”37 His mocking tone shows his disdain for anyone who regards
the law as legitimate, and therefore a reason for acting. Economic theory has no place for actors
who are guided by legal norms because they regard them as having moral force.

But what would be the normative argument for taking a purely instrumental stance toward
the law? It cannot be the observation that the world is full of Holmesian bad men, which would
be a simplistic version of G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy.38 The most promising candidate for
an argument in favor of instrumentalism relies on libertarian premises — the fundamental moral
significance of human freedom, and the concomitant requirements that any restrictions on liberty
imposed by the state be justified by reasons shared by the object of coercion, general, knowable
in advance of acting, and no broader than necessary to accomplish their purpose. Indeed, a deep
insight of modern legal ethics theory, characteristic of the work of William Simon and Robert
Gordon, is the extent to which the prevailing attitudes of practicing lawyers toward the law are
reflective of the assumption that the purpose of the legal system is to delineate a sphere of
individual autonomy which is protected against interference by other individuals or the state.39
But Simon and Gordon have not only recognized this foundation — they, along with David
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Id.
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G.E. M OORE , P RINCIPIA E THICA 13 (1903 ).

39

See W ILLIAM S IM O N , T HE P RACT ICE OF J USTICE 27 (1998 ) (calling this the “Libertarian Premise”);
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[hereinafter, “G ordon, Hired Guns”]. For the best known defense of the minimal state, grounded in the value of
autonomy, see R OBERT N OZICK , A N A R C HY , S TATE , A N D U TO PIA (1974).

17

Luban and others, have completely demolished it.40 In brief, their arguments are that the
autonomy of the client is not some kind of moral trump card over the lawyer’s own moral
agency, which would require reasoning about the permissibility of the client’s ends quite apart
from considerations of the client’s autonomy; that citizens are not entitled to autonomy as such,
but only to a just measure of autonomy that is compatible with the rights of others; that liberty is
only one value among others that a decent legal system would seek to protect; that lawyers
participate to such a great extent in interpreting and applying the law that legal restrictions on
client autonomy can hardly be said to be impartial and general; and that even if autonomy were
the most important thing, its exercise depends on a stable framework of legal norms and
institutions, which is undercut by instrumentalist approaches to the law.

The other principal argument for taking an instrumental stance toward the law trades on
overgeneralization from the paradigm of adversarial litigation. The most shopworn aphorism in
legal ethics is that a lawyer’s primary duty is to “represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law.”41 Lawyers who seize on this maxim as a justification for interpreting the law as
Holmesian bad men often elide the distinction between acting as an advocate in litigation and
acting as a counselor or transactional engineer. Ask a securities lawyer why she opposes a
requirement to report out evidence of client fraud, and she is likely to mention the principle of
zealous representation, seemingly without awareness that this phrase, as originally stated in the

40

See D A V ID L UBAN , L A W Y E R S A N D J USTICE 167 -69 (1 988 ); David Lu ban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A
Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM . B. F O U N D . R ES . J. 637 (1986 ).
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Model Rules, applied only to representation in litigation. For good reason, however, a lawyer’s
attitude toward the law must vary according to the context in which she is representing a client.42
A well prepared adversary and a fully informed tribunal are institutional features that are capable
of countering excessive adversarial zeal in litigation and ensuring that legal norms are applied in
an impartial manner. In litigation, the judge serves as the custodian of the law, and as long as she
is adequately informed and not misled, the parties’ lawyers are justified in leaving to the judge
the responsibility for taking care of the law. Without an impartial referee, orderly procedures,
rules for obtaining, introducing, and excluding evidence, and a competent opposing party,
however, transactional lawyering is so different from adversarial litigation that one wonders why
anyone has ever thought to analogize the role of lawyer from one context to the other.43
Whatever psychological enthusiasm a lawyer might feel for her client’s cause, the kind of zealous
representation a lawyer may provide in counseling and transactional practice is circumscribed by
a heightened obligation not to treat the law instrumentally. In effect, the legal system has
delegated the judge’s caretaker function to the lawyer in cases where the lawyer’s interpretation

42

The Mo del Code, which was frequently criticized for assimilating all lawyering activities to adversarial
litigation, actually recognizes quite plainly the importance of context. “W here the bounds of law are uncertain, the
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technical, or instrumental attitude toward the law is app ropriate only (if at all) in adversarial litigation, and only
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of the law is not subject to review by an impartial referee.

The arguments in this Article are an attempt to provide a secure jurisprudential
foundation for this “caretaker” theory of the authority of law and of legal interpretation — a
model of lawyering which treats legal norms seriously as reasons in a lawyer’s practical
deliberation. I have called this the authority conception of legal ethics.44 In this view, legal rules
are not only legitimate reasons for action but preclude recourse to ordinary first-order moral
reasons, including the value of client autonomy. The reason for this preclusion is that the need
for law arises from recognition of deep and persistent disagreement, resulting from a plurality of
worthwhile human goods, values and forms of life; empirical uncertainty; divergent evaluative
standpoints; and what Hume called the circumstances of justice — moderate scarcity and limited
benevolence.45 On many moral or political questions of significance, we can expect
disagreement in good faith that cannot be resolved by reasoning alone; in addition, the
participants in the debate recognize that something must be done, one way or the other, about the
issue. When these conditions obtain, the parties to the normative disagreement share a desire for
an at least provisional settlement of the issue, enabling coordinated activity notwithstanding the
intractable dispute. Individuals turn to an impartial, third-party mechanism — the law —
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See W endel, supra note ___, at 364.
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See W ILLIAM A. G A LS T O N, L IBERA L P LURALISM 5-6, 28-35 (2002); A M Y G U T M A N N & D EN N IS
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because they share the desire for peaceful cooperation and settlement.46 Because the law permits
them to do better at realizing this interest than they would on their own, and because it is adopted
through procedures that meet a threshold standard of fairness and respect for the parties to the
normative disputes, the law has authority in the domain of the disagreement and precludes
practical reasoning on the basis of the reasons that were relevant to the underlying controversy.47
This is essentially the argument for the negative aspect of professionalism, which preempts
recourse to reasons that would otherwise require a different action in the circumstances, where a
legal norm is in force. The positive aspect of professionalism flows from the same conception of
the authority of law, and requires lawyers to interpret legal norms in such a way that the law can
continue to perform its coordination and settlement functions.

Before working through the defense of this position in detail, it may be helpful to take a
preliminary look at some examples of how one’s interpretive attitude would make a difference to
judicial decisions or the advice given to clients. (The final section of the Article will review a
longer example involving the Enron transactions.) As the examples should make clear, the
approach to legal interpretation that flows from the authority conception of legal ethics is
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AND

47

This conc eption of the authority of law is de rived from J osep h Raz’s normal justification the sis. See
J O S E PH R AZ , T HE M ORA LITY O F F R E ED O M 53 (1 986 ); Joseph R az, Introduction, in AUTHORITY 1, 12-13 (Joseph Raz
ed. 1990 ). It is substantially influenced by Jerem y W aldro n’s use of the Razian no rmal justification the sis (NJ T).
See W A LD R O N , supra note _ __, at 95-96. Both are discussed in considerably more detail in W endel, supra note _ __.
I am m aking stro nger claims for the forc e of the N JT than Raz wo uld accept, but I be lieve they are co nsistent with
W aldro n’s expansive use of R az’s co ncep tion of authority.

21

different from both textualism and some of its more loosely structured competitors.48 Legal texts
alone cannot achieve the settlement that is the function of law, because they are never selfinterpreting. Texts must be interpreted in light of their evident purpose, the background against
which they were enacted, and the interpretive understandings of the relevant community of
lawyers and judges. The most important features of this style of interpretation is the preclusion
of the policy preferences or first-order moral beliefs of interpreters, and the resistance to the
manipulation of the form of legal norms to defeat their substance. Professionalism, as defended
here, does not instruct lawyers to act in the public interest, which may be internally incoherent
and normatively contested, but by what the public has come up with as its laws, through the
process of legislation, administrative rulemaking, and adjudication. Professionalism is grounded
in fidelity to a society’s laws, but it is critical that law not be understood narrowly or
formalistically. Rather, the law must be interpreted in a way that ensures it will continue to have
the capacity to coordinate social action against a background of persistent first-order normative
disagreement.
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Stephen B reyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. C AL. L. R EV . 845 (1992); William
N. E skridge, Jr., The N ew Textualism, 37 UCLA L. R EV . 621 (1990); W illiam N . Eskrid ge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN . L. R EV . 321 (1990); Frederick S chauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SU P . C T . R EV . 231 [hereinafter, “Schauer,
Statutory Construction”]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 H ARV . L. R EV . 405
(1989); Daniel A. Fa rber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 G EO . L.J. 281 (1989); Frank H.
Easterbro ok, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. C H I. L. R EV . 533 (1983 ).
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B.

Some Examples.

The conception of professionalism I have been defending makes reference to “substantive
meanings” of legal norms, as opposed to their mere formal expression. One natural objection to
this position is that legal norms do not have a substantive meaning apart from their textual form.
The following two examples of ethical dilemmas in lawyering are designed to show that even the
simplest legal norms, either statutes or cases, depend for their meaning on interpretive
understandings that are not captured in texts themselves. If a reader is persuaded that these nontextual conventions and practices of legal reasoning are actually relevant to determining the
relevant law, then the only remaining step in the argument for professionalism is to establish the
wrongfulness of ignoring them.

The Miserly Railroad. The Northern Atlantic Railroad has asked its general counsel
whether it is required to make an expensive modification to its locomotives. It is concerned that
a new federal statute may mandate retrofitting the locomotives with an automatic coupling
device.49 The relevant statutory language reads:

On and after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and ninety-eight, it shall be
unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its
line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling
automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of
men going between the ends of the cars.

49

This problem is based on Joh nson v. South ern P acific, 196 U.S. 1 (19 04), reversing 117 F. 462 (8th Cir.
190 2), two caseb ook classics illustra ting issues in statutory interpretation, but I freely em bellished ma ny of the facts.

23

The railroad’s vice-president for engineering told the general counsel that for technical reasons, it
is much more difficult to equip locomotives, as opposed to ordinary cars, with automatic
coupling devices. She pointed out that the statute requires automatic couplers on “cars,” which
in the ordinary parlance of railroad workers would not be understood to include locomotives.
(She actually overheard a snippet of dialogue in which one employee at a switching yard asked,
“are there any cars on that track?” and was told, “nope, just a locomotive.”) Moreover, the
examples used to illustrate the definition of “car” in the Oxford English Dictionary all referred to
conveyances that are pulled by a locomotive: passenger car, sleeping car, coal car, freight car,
and so on. Her argument was supported by the use in the statute of the verb “haul,” of which
“car” is an object — locomotives are not hauled; they do the hauling. The general counsel also
remembered reading in law school a case involving the theft of an airplane, in which the
Supreme Court noted that the operative term “vehicle” did not “evoke in the common mind” the
image of an airplane.50 What advice should the general counsel give to the railroad regarding
compliance with the statute?

Fine Print on the Ticket.51 Festival Cruise Lines hired an outside law firm to review its
standard ticket contract, and recommend changes if necessary. One provision caught the eye of a
50

McBoyle v. U nited States, 28 3 U .S. 25 (1931) (interpreting a statute criminalizing “tra nspo rting in
interstate commerce a mo tor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen”).
51

The facts of this problem are taken from Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (199 1). The issue
of lawyers’ ethical re sponsibility for d rafting ad hesion contracts has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Henry
Ord ower, Tow ard a M ultiple P arty R epresenta tion M ode l: Mo dera ting P ower Disparity, 64 O H IO S T . L.J. 1263
(2003); W illiam T . Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System: A Model Rule That Should Have
Been, 6 G EO . J. L EGA L E THICS 799 (1993). See also Robe rt A. H illman & Jeffrey J. R achlinsk i, Stand ard F orm
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 NYU L. R EV . 429 (2002) (not focusing on lawyers, but providing an
interesting overview of technological innovations in standard-form contracts, such as shrink-wrap and “click-wrap”
licenses).
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junior associate in the firm who had been assigned to review the contract:

It is agreed by and between the Guest and Festival that all disputes and matters
whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract or the
Guest's cruise, including travel to and from the vessel, shall be litigated, if at all,
before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
Miami, or as to those lawsuits to which the Federal Courts of the United States
lack subject matter jurisdiction, before a court located in Miami-Dade County,
Florida, U.S.A. to the exclusion of the Courts of any other county, state or
country.52

Having had many depressing experiences with standard-form leases as a graduate student,53 the
associate questioned the propriety of including the forum-selection clause in the cruise contract.
He was troubled by uncertainty in the law. On the one hand, the Supreme Court had upheld
forum-selection clauses when negotiated between two sophisticated business parties, specifically
in the maritime context.54 On the other hand, appellate courts had refused to enforce certain
terms in standard-form contracts where one party had an absence of meaningful choice as to
whether to accept a contract term that is unreasonably favorable to the other party.55 He also
knew that many passengers would be coming from homes far away from Miami, and would face
considerable inconvenience and expense if they were required to litigate in South Florida.
Although the language of the contract was clear, it was buried in the fine print on the back of the
ticket, which passengers never read. The associate therefore worried that including the contract

52

This language is currently in use by Ca rnival C ruise Lines in its stand ard form ticke t contract.
<http://www.carnival.com/CMS/Static_Temp lates/ticket_contract.aspx> (visited 6/19/04).
53

See Daniel E. W enner, Renting in Collegetown, 84 COR NE LL L. R EV . 543 (1999 ).

54

The Breme n v. Zap ata O ff-Shore , 407 U.S. 1 (19 72).

55

W illiams v. W alker-T hom as Furniture C o., 35 0 F.2 d 44 5 (D .C. Cir. 196 5).
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term might constitute”conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,”56 but his
supervisor told him that the client insisted on retaining the forum-selection clause, unless it was
plainly illegal. The associate concluded that there was no plain illegality, reasoned that his
supervisor’s instructions were a “reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional
duty,”57 and said nothing more. Should he have acquiesced in the inclusion of the contract term?

In both of these cases, the content of the law on point is facially uncertain, if law is
understood as a property of legal texts alone. In the railroad case, the apparent uncertainty is the
result of linguistic ambiguity (does the term “car” encompass locomotives?); in the forumselection clause case, it is the result of conflicting precedents or competing analogies (“is the
cruise case more like a different kind of maritime activity or a different kind of consumer sales
contract?”). I suspect, however, that readers have already concluded that these cases do not
actually involve any serious uncertainty. 58 The railroad must equip the locomotives with
automatic couplers, and the cruise line is free to include the forum-selection clause in the
contract. What justifies these conclusions? The answer to any question of legal interpretation is
ultimately provided by the conventions and practices of legal reasoning, which form the basis for
the exercise of informed, sound “situation sense,” prudence, practical reasoning, or judgment.59
56

M OD EL R ULES , supra note ___, Rule 8.4(c).

57

Id., Rule 5.2(b).

58

Cf. Fred erick S chauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. C AL. L. R EV . 399 (1985 ) (arguing that doctrinal, factual, and
linguistic factors may make a particular outcome easy for competent lawyers to predict).
59

“Situation sense” is a term favore d by K arl Llewellyn. See K AR L L L EW E LL YN , T HE C O M M O N L AW
T R A D IT IO N : D ECIDING A PPE ALS 60-61 , 268-85 (1960). Anthony Kronm an uses the Aristotelian terms p rudence (as a
translation of phrone sis) and practical wisdom to convey a similar notion. See A N T H O N Y T. K RONMAN , T HE L OST
L AWYER (1993); Antho ny T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Y ALE L.J. 1985). Mo dern
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Legal reasoning begins with the text of statutes and the holdings of cases, to be sure, but
does not end there. Indeed, a judge or lawyer might commit the vice of “hypertextualism” by
pretending that the language of a statute, dictionary definitions, and rules of syntax are
sufficiently determinate to produce an objective interpretation of a text.60 Although the statute in
the railroad case uses the word “car,” the legislature may have intended to require coupling
devices on locomotives as well (perhaps after hearing testimony about the frequency of
locomotive-car coupling accidents), and only a myopic fixation on the literal language of the
statute would cause an interpreter to miss this apparent meaning of the text. Moreover, statutory
language, definitions of words, canons of construction, and so on, might create as much
interpretive freedom as more expansive methods like purposivism or intentionalism, thereby
permitting the interpreter to impose her own policy preferences on the text, under the guise of
rendering an objective reading. Similarly, in common-law reasoning, the facts and arguments set
out in a given judicial opinion are highly manipulable when considered in isolation. Fortunately,
in both of these styles of legal reasoning, there are second-level principles that have developed in
any given domain of law that stabilize and regulate interpretation.61

commentators on statutory interpretation favor the term “practical reason.” See, e.g., Farb er, Inevitability, supra
note _ __; E skridge & F rickey, supra note _ __; see also B U R T O N, supra note ___, at 6 n.9 (citing sources). One
might even use the term “pragmatism ,” as po pularized b y Richa rd P osner, amo ng others. See, e.g., Richard Posner,
Pragmatic Adjudication, in T HE R EVIVAL OF P RAGMATISM 235 (M orris Dickstein ed. 1998). I will use the term
judgment throughout the Article, but it should be understood that I am appealing to this vigorous tradition of legal
theory, whatever label a particular writer chooses. And I intend as well to appeal (without elaboration, because of
the constraints of space and relevance) to the work of critics within moral philosophy who seek to establish objective
truths of ethics while making roo m for contextual judgment. See, e.g., H IL AR Y P UTNAM , E THICS W IT H O U T
O NTOLOGY (2004).
60

Pierce, supra note ___, at 750-52.

61

See, e.g., M E LV IN A R O N E ISENBERG , T HE N ATURE OF THE C O M M O N L AW (1988); Owe n M . Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN . L. R EV . 739 (1982 ).
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1.

Statutory Analysis.

Consider first an example of statutory interpretation — the railroad case. The word “car”
in isolation does not answer the question whether the railroad is required to equip its locomotives
with automatic couplers; if anything, it suggests a counterintuitive negative response. Starting
with the text of the statute does tell us something; under this particular statute the railroad is not
required to equip cars with air brakes, doors that can be opened from the inside, or some other
useful safety feature. But the text still leaves interpretive puzzles. What about the absence of the
term “locomotive”? Congress could easily have drafted the provision to read “any car or
locomotive . . . not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact.” Under the canon
of construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius,62 an interpreter should infer from
the inclusion of the term “car” and the absence of the term “locomotive” that Congress intended
the statute not to apply to locomotives. Of course, as Karl Llewellyn demonstrated in one of the
best known critiques of formalism, every canon of statutory construction has an opposing canon,
which should be used “when the context dictates.”63 In this case, if the context so dictates, one
could argue that locomotives should be included from the opposing canon that the statute may
comprehend cases beyond those specifically mentioned in the text, particularly if it is apparent

62

2A N O R M A N J. S INGER , S U T H ER LA N D S T A TU T O R Y C O N S TR U C TIO N § 47 .23, at 216 -17 (5 th ed. 1 992 ).
This was one of the argum ents ma de by the court of ap peals in this case. See 117 F. at ___.
63

Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 V A N D . L. R EV . 395, 401-06 (19 50). A notorious example of a court disregarding the
expressio unius cano n is Ho ly Trinity Churc h v. United S tates, 14 3 U .S. 45 7 (1892 ), in which a statute m aking it a
crime to assist “the importation or migration o f any alien” contained exceptions for certain categories o f workers,
such as lecturers, actors, and domestic servants, but said nothing about “brain toilers” and “ministers of the gospel.”
The Co urt nevertheless held the statute inapplicable to an elite New Y ork City church which had arranged for the
entry of its new recto r from England.
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that the statute has a purpose (such as protecting the safety of railroad workers) that would be
advanced by requiring couplers on locomotives.64 And these are only principles of interpretation
based on the language of a statute. There are also policy-based aids to construction, such as the
rule of lenity, which provides that an ambiguous criminal statute should be read narrowly.65 The
case mentioned by the railroad’s vice-president, involving the theft of an airplane, can arguably
be justified on this basis. Furthermore, we can ascribe a variety of hypothetical intentions to
Congress (in the absence of clear legislative history).66 Perhaps Congress wanted to improve
safety for railroad workers, even though it would impose high costs on the railroads, in which
case couplers should be required on locomotives. On the other hand, the statute may have

64

In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Congressional intention and the
purpose of the statute. See 196 U.S. at ___.
65

3 S INGER , supra note ___ § 59.03, at 102-05. The court of appeals also relied on the rule of lenity. 117

F. at ___.
66

Interpretation by ascription-of-intention is a disfav ored metho dolo gy in mo dern jurisprudence, owing to
pow erful critiques by Dworkin and o thers. See D W O RKIN , supra note _ __, at 313 -27; W A LD R O N , supra note ___, at
124 -29; A N T O N IN S CAL IA , A M ATTER O F I N T ER P R ET A TIO N 29-3 2 (1997 ); Eskridge & Fricke y, supra note ___, at
325 -32; E asterbrook, supra note _ __; S tephe n F. W illiams, Restoring Con text, Distorting Tex t: Legislative History
and the Problem of Age, 66 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV . 1366 (1998). Briefly, the problems with imputing intentions to a
multi-member representative body are that there is no speaker or actor to whom to ascribe an actual unitary intention,
and that constructing a fictional unitary intention by comb ining the intentions of individual leg islators is doom ed to
failure because of theoretical difficulties involved in identifying and cumulating the mental states of dozens, if not
hundreds of legislators. Each legislator may had a variety of mental states with respect to the proposed legislation —
enthusiastic support, cautious assent, isolated qualm s, serious reservations, or utter indifference. Le gislators also
may be moved by motives of rent-seeking, party loyalty, or logrolling , without regard to the content of the provision
unde r consideration. See D AN IEL A. F ARBER & P HILIP P. F RICKEY, L A W A N D P UBLIC C HOICE (1991). Specifically
with respect to intention regarding interpretation, a legislator may hope that an interpreter would read the text in a
particular way, even though she fully exp ected a different interpretation to gain accep tance. Even if we could
identify the intentions of individuals, the actual text voted on by the majority may represent the intention of none of
the individuals, because of the way preferences are registered in an assembly. Attempting to divine collective
intention from legislative history is no less problematic, because of the manipulability of legislative history and the
multiplicity of interpretations that can be supported by the relevant history documents such as committee reports and
remarks made on the floor by supporters and opponents of the bill. Interpreting statutes by selecting bits and pieces
of legislative history has often been criticized as tantamount to “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.”
See Patricia W ald, Som e Ob servations on the U se of Legislative History in the 1 981 Supreme C ourt Term , 68 IO W A
L. R EV . 195 , 214 (1983); Conroy v. A niskoff, 507 U .S. 51 1, 51 9 (1993 ) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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represented a compromise between workplace-safety advocates and the railroad industry, in
which case it fairly should be read as requiring couplers only on non-locomotive cars.67

As in most legal cases, it is possible to line up arguments in favor of both positions in the
railroad case. This is the point at which analysis of statutory interpretation often resorts to
metaphors of weighing and balancing to capture the process of exercising judgment. The trouble
with these tropes is that the process of comparison they suggest creates an illusion of precision
which in turn encourages unrealistic expectations about the objectivity of judging. To put it
another way, judgment sometimes functions as a black box in legal theory — one result or
another mysteriously pops out of the decision-making machinery, but the process itself is opaque
to observation and criticism from a third-person point of view. Sophisticated legal theorists do
not use judgment in this way, however. In every serious account of legal interpretation, the
interpreter’s judgment is constrained by something external to the interpreter, which is available
for public observation and criticism. This external constraint of public justifiability secures the
objectivity of judgment against the critique that the interpreter is simply imposing her own policy

67

The scheme which limited couplers to non-loco motive cars might be an examp le of what Dw orkin would
call a “checkerboard” statute, which seems to re solve the disp ute in an arbitrary or unprincipled way. See D W O RKIN ,
supra note ___, at 178-84. Dwo rkin believes he is tapping into a generally shared intuition that checkerboard
statutes are objectionable because we would prefer ex an te that our preferred legal norm be either adopted or
rejected, but not compromised. “Even if I thought strict liability for accidents wrong in principle, I would prefer that
manufacturers of both washing machines and automobiles be held to that standard than that only one of them be.”
Id. at 182. But leaving aside obvious checkerboards like a statute that made abortion legal on Mondays but illegal
on T uesdays, it is not clear that all legislative co mpromise s like Dworkin’s product liability statute are unprincipled.
There may be go od reasons for imposing strict liability on automobile manufacturers but not washing machine
manufacturers. (Perhaps washing machines are easier for users to inspect, or the expected cost of accidents is not as
high, as comp ared with automob iles.) In the ra ilroad case, if for some reason it is significantly more expensive to
install couplers on locomotives, or if the operation of automatic couplers on locomotives creates some new danger
that would not be present if they were used only on non-locomotive cars, the exclusion of locomotives from the
coupler requirement would not be a chec kerboard statute in D workin’s sense.

30

preferences on the law.

For example, Ronald Dworkin is the most enthusiastic proponent of a thoroughgoing
interpretive approach to law, and he is quite clear that his hypothetical interpreter, the
superhuman judge Hercules, must exercise judgment with respect to an external standard — the
best justification of a legal speech-act (a judicial decision or the enactment of a statute) where
“best” is understood in terms of the coherence of the principles underlying the act (i.e. as reasons
explaining and justifying the act) with a political community’s ideals of integrity, fairness, and
political due process.68 Dworkin refers to this external constraint as integrity, and offers integrity
as a criterion for others to judge whether Hercules has exercised his judgment correctly. Other
theorists construct a framework of criteria, rebuttable presumptions, or a continuum of
complementary interpretive methodologies.69 However these external checks on interpretive
discretion are constructed, they are essential to ensure against not only rampant subjectivity by
the interpreter, but also against reaching ex post evaluations of the propriety of an interpretation
that would not have been as clear ex ante.70

To these models of judgment I would add a critical jurisprudential element:
68

D W O RKIN , supra note ___, at 337-38, 345-46.

69

See Eskridge, Dynam ic, supra note _ __, at 149 6-97 (proposing continuum in which text controls where it
provides determinate answers, but history, social and legal context, and evolutive context assume more importance
as textualist interpretations b ecome m ore contestible); Eskridge & F rickey, supra note ___, at 352-53 (prop osing
“funnel of abstraction” in which interpreter begins with statutory text and tests potential interpretations for historical
accuracy and conformity to contemporary circumstances and values).
70

Cf. Schw arcz, Use a nd A buse, supra note 1, at 1313 (suggesting that some of the decisions of
accountants and lawyers in the Enron transactions may look bad ex post, but at the time were defensible exercises of
discretionary judgm ent).
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Interpretation is not a function of a single judicial or lawyerly mind, acting alone.71 Rather, it is a
community-bound enterprise, in which the criteria for reasonable exercise of judgment are
elaborated intersubjectively, among an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to
law. These criteria are available to provide a justification of a decision.72 As Anthony Kronman
correctly points out, a person characterized by good judgment “is not someone who from time to
time merely makes certain strikingly appropriate oracular pronouncements.”73 Rather, a person
of good judgment can, if called upon to do so, provide a reasoned explanation of her decision.74
This explanation is a public phenomenon, in the sense that the interpreter is appealing to shared
community standards for evaluating the appropriateness of interpretation. In this way, the
interpreter’s discretion is constrained by public norms regulating the understanding of legal texts.
The meaning of these texts therefore becomes a property of the community, which confers the
ultimate authority on legal norms, and the community’s standards are legitimate to the extent
they respect the purpose of law, which is to enable people to live peacefully together, flourish,
and achieve their common ends.

A textualist might respond that I have assumed too hastily that judgment is necessary.
Perhaps the plain language if the statute provides sufficient determinacy to accomplish the

71

Gerald Postema, “Protestant” Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 L A W & P H IL . 283 (1987).

72

See W ILLIAM T W IN IN G , K AR L L LEWELLYN AND THE R EALIST M O V E M EN T 205 (197 3) (discussing
Llewellyn’s arguments in The Common Law Tradition); B U R T O N, supra note ___, at 19-22 (arguing that the rule of
law de mands that judges be able to justify their de cisions o n the basis of reasons abo ut what the law is, as oppo sed to
what they think it should be).
73

Antho ny T. Kro nman, Living in the Law, 54 U. C H I. L. R EV . 835, 848 (19 87).

74

H ART & S ACKS , supra note __, at 143.

32

settlement of normative disputes that is the function of law. One might also make the argument
from the authority of law by noting that legal norms are legitimate only to the extent they are
enacted by fair procedures, and in the case of legislation, those procedures involve a majority
vote on a particular form of words embodied in the resolution under discussion.75 But the
argument from authority shows only that “the product of legislation” is entitled to respect, not
that the product of legislation is simply a text, the interpretation of which is confined to the literal
language of the enactment. Even Jeremy Waldron, who makes the argument from authority
powerfully, concedes that “statutes need interpretation [and] the words of the enactment (and
their ‘plain meaning’) are often insufficient to determine the statute’s application.”76 For
Waldron, the important thing is that the interpretive process begin with the sense that there is a
single, definitive proposal under discussion, and that the meaning of the proposal should be
recovered by beginning with the text of the enactment. Suppose in the railroad case that the
legislature had responded to a series of lurid reports of accidents, and resulting public outcry. In
the course of considering some response, it became apparent that workers were injured by
attaching locomotives to cars as well as by hooking non-locomotive cars together. The course of
discussion in the legislature reveals that all members of the assembly were concerned with this
problem in toto, although the members disagreed on other points, such as whether to make new
safety measures mandatory or voluntary. In that instance, is there any doubt that the word “car”
should be interpreted to include locomotives? This interpretation is not undermined by the
reasons for treating the enactment as authoritative, because the legislative response was aimed at

75

W A LD R O N , supra note ___, at 25, 77-82.

76

Id. at 79.
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settling some disagreement other than a disagreement over whether the word “car” should
include locomotives. Thus, one should not assume that the functional argument for the authority
of law necessarily entails a textualist interpretive methodology; in fact, it may support a broader
purposivist approach to statutory meaning. 77

2.

Common-Law Reasoning.

Judgment is also necessary in common-law reasoning because it is impossible fully to
specify meta-rules that capture the complexity of legal interpretation, when the decisionmaker
must consider texts, principles, and facts, as well as subsidiary norms such as rules of legal
salience (which point to aspects of the facts that are germane to the decision), considerations of
weight and priority among competing norms, and the possibility of justified departures from
previously sanctioned interpretations. Consider a famous example of the interplay between facts
and rules in case interpretation, from Karl Llewellyn’s Bramble Bush:

What are the facts? The plaintiff’s name is Atkinson and the defendant’s
Walpole. The defendant, despite his name, is an Italian by extraction, but the
plaintiff’s ancestors came over with the Pilgrims. The defendant has a schnauzerdog named Walter, red hair, and $30,000 worth of life insurance. . . . The
defendant’s auto was a Buick painted pale magenta. He is married. His wife was
in the back seat, an irritable, somewhat faded blonde. She was attempting backseat driving when the accident occurred. He had turned around to make objection.
In the process the car swerved and hit the plaintiff. The sun was shining; there
was a rather lovely dappled sky low to the West. The time was late October on a
77

See Lawrence M. Solan , Priva te Langu age , Public La ws: The C entra l Role of Leg islative In tent in
Statutory Interpretation, __ G EO . L.J. __ (2004) (“At the very least [legislative history] can help us to determine
whether the difficulty in applying the statute results from an unfortunate choice of statutory language to effectuate a
legislative goal tha t is very clear once one investigates the matter.”); W illiam N . Eskrid ge, Jr., The Circumstances of
Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100 CO LU M . L. R EV . 558 , 566 (2000) (book review).
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Tuesday. The road was smooth, concrete. It had been put in by the McCarthy
Road Work Company.78

It does not take more than a couple of weeks of law school for a first-year student to learn to
winnow out the relevant facts from an example like this. But what has the student learned?
Surely not a system of rules that can be applied deductively (e.g. “if the dispute involves an auto
accident, road conditions may be relevant but not the plaintiff’s ethnic ancestry”), because any set
of rules would quickly become too complex to learn and apply. For example, the identity of the
construction company may or may not be legally salient, depending on whether the case involves
allegations that the design of the road contributed to poor visibility. Life insurance may matter if
this is a case in which the collateral source rule is an issue. Even the ethnic background of the
plaintiff and defendant might conceivably matter if the auto accident had been only the precursor
to a violent argument in which insults were exchanged, and out of which the plaintiff claims
infliction of emotional distress.79 Some knowledge of the law is necessary to know which facts
are relevant, but the relevance-making relationship between law and facts is not constituted by
rules.80 Instead of rule-application, this reasoning process involves the exercise of informed

78

K AR L L L EW E LL YN , T HE B RAMBLE B USH 46-47 (195 1) (emphasis in original).

79

See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998) (recognizing cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising out of ra cial epithets uttered in an emp loyment setting).
80

Cf. B ARBARA H ERMAN , T HE P RACT ICE OF M OR AL J U D G M E N T 75 (1993 ) (“An agent who came to the
[Kantian Categorical Imperative] procedure with no knowledge of the moral characteristics of actions would be very
unlikely to describe his a ction in a morally app ropriate way.”). See also Michael Moore, Torture and the Balance of
Evils, 23 ISRA EL L. R EV . 280, 28 7-88 (1 989) (arguing that mora l knowledge of the dom ain of conseq uentialist
calculation is needed before it is possible to proceed to consider consequences in moral reasoning). Note that Moore
doe s not sub scribe to an intuitionist view, in which knowledge of the doma in of consequentialist ca lculation is
something mysterious and ineffable; rather, he reviews numerous rigorous standards (such as the act/omission and
intended/foreseeable distinctions, the preexisting peril doctrine, and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s principle of redirecting
harms) which justify the bo unda ry between p ermissible and imp ermissible use of consequences in mo ral reasoning.
Id. at 299-30 8. M oore boils these down to the standard threefold analysis of criminal law culpab ility, id. at 308-09,
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professional judgment, which can be justified on the basis of rules and standards, but which is
always incompletely specified, or underdetermined by rules and standards. These higher-order
norms are acquired and internalized through professional education and followed largely
unconsciously within a given interpretive community.

My claim is that these higher-order norms are legitimate, and have authority to the
exclusion of ordinary moral reasons, to the extent they enable to law to fulfill its function of
optimizing people’s ability to work together to achieve common projects.81 The law would fail at
this end if one of two conditions obtained: (1) it were impossible for a representative of a client
to discern the content of the law, or (2) it were permissible for individual legal interpreters, such
as lawyers, to manipulate the formal expression of legal norms to make them mean anything at
all, thereby defeating their substantive purpose. Thus, if it is apparent that the purpose of the
statute in the railroad case is to prevent accidents caused by workers getting their hands caught in
manual coupling mechanisms, there will be good grounds for interpreting the statute to require
automatic couplers on locomotives. Naturally, a contrary purpose may be apparent — perhaps,
as suggested previously, the statute was a compromise between advocates of a comprehensive
reform of railroad safety regulations and those who preferred a more cautious, incremental
approach. In that case, one might make a reasonable argument for not requiring the automatic

but the application of these criteria still calls for the exercise of judgment, as opposed to deductive reasoning. The
point is not that the student’s judgment in my example, or the ascription of responsibility in Moore’s, is incapable of
being justified or theorized, but that the precise nature of reasoning process is often opaque to the person exercising
judgment. See generally D O N A LD S C H Ö N , T HE R EFLECTIVE P RACTITIONER : H O W P ROFESSIONALS T H IN K IN A C T IO N
(1983).
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H ART & S ACKS , supra note _ __, at 146 -48.
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couplers on locomotives. But the crucial term here is reasonable. The demand is, in any event,
for a reasoned elaboration of an interpretation of legal texts. Appealing only to formal features
like the statutory text is not a reasoned elaboration, absent some argument why the form alone
ought to have dispositive importance in the particular case. Similarly, in the forum-selection
clause case, the lawyer must be able to offer a reasoned argument for analogizing the clause in
the cruise ticket to either the forum-selection clause in the cargo carriage contract (permissible)
or the unconscionable contract terms in the installment-sales contract (impermissible).
Professionalism does not necessarily favor one interpretation or another, but it does rule out the
kind of facile analogy-drawing that might be used by a lawyer who was interested only in taking
advantage of a superficial similarity between two cases.

3.

Hard Cases and Right Answers.

Finally, to anticipate a common objection to this line of reasoning, it is important to
emphasize that I am not denying the existence of “hard cases,” where the relevant legal texts and
interpretive practices underdetermine the result.82 Hart and Sacks confidently assert that
“[u]nderlying every rule and standard . . . is at least a policy and in most cases a principle [which
is] available to guide judgment in resolving uncertainties about the arrangement’s meaning.”83
Although I share their belief that underlying purposes, policies, and principles are available to
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See B U R T O N, supra note _ __, at xii, 5-12, 47-4 8, 79 -80. T he term “hard cases” is associated with
Dworkin’s debate with H art. See Ronald D workin, Hard Cases, in T AKING R IGHTS S ERIO US LY 81 (1977)
[hereinafter, “D workin, Hard Cases”].
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guide judgment, the passage quoted is made too strong by the singular nouns — a policy, a
principle. Many legal rules and standards serve multiple, sometimes conflicting purposes. In
addition, purpose is not the only key to a statute’s meaning — the express language of the statute
may be in conflict with its purpose, and there may be other indications, such as legislative history
and context, that cut against the interpretation suggested by the apparent purpose (even if there is
only one). For these reasons, there are a great many cases in which competent judges or lawyers,
reasoning in good faith, could reach result A or result B, and be deemed by a competent observer
to have performed her job adequately.84 An observer might disagree with B, and believe that A
was the better result, but nevertheless concede that B was within the range of plausible,
justifiable results.85 For example, consider a municipal ordinance that bans vehicles in excess of
6,000 pounds from residential streets — does the ordinance apply to monster sport-utility
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Ken t Greenawalt, Discretion and the Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind
Judges, 75 CO LU M . L. R EV . 359 , 368 -69 (1 975 ).
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I do not believe it is possible to define “plausible” legal arguments in mathematical terms — e.g. whether
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Plausible is certainly more than passing the proverbial straight-face test. The standard should be understood instead
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with reference to a kind of hypothetical reasonable observer. One possible heuristic is that if a lawyer would be
com fortable making the argument to the judge for wh om she clerked, a professor she respects, or a colleague who is
known for her good sense and judgment, the argument is plausible. If the lawyer could stand behind an
interpretation, take pride in it, and offer it to a third party the lawyer respects for her sound judgment, then the
interpretation is plausib le.
I reco gnize that it can be difficult to give a rigorous logical account o f the distinction be tween a plainly
implausible legal argument (say, one with only a 1% chance of success) and a clearly plausible one (say, one with a
98% chanc e of success). See Sorites Parado x, in T HE C AMBRIDGE D ICTION ARY OF P H IL OS O P HY 864 (Robert Audi
ed., 2d ed. 199 9); Jeremy W aldro n, Vagueness in Law and Languag e: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. R EV .
523 (1994). But law does not lend itself to bivalent logic and always demands the exercise of judgment. Further
supp ort for this assertion must await the a rguments in Se ction _ __. A s a preliminary m atter, eve n if we are uncertain
whether we need three, four, five, or n stones to make a he ap, it do es not mean that there are no such things as heaps.
Moore, supra note _ __, at 332 . By analogy, even if we may be unsure on the margins whether an argument is
frivolous, we should not co nclude that there is no such thing as a frivolous argume nt.
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vehicles like the Ford Excursion and Cadillac Escalade?86 The ordinance is intended to reduce
wear and tear on municipal streets, as well as prevent accidents caused by heavy trucks driving in
residential neighborhoods. Not only do large SUVs fall within the prohibition created by the
literal language of the statute, but they pose many of the same dangers; they are within the
“mischief” sought to be remedied by the statute, as British lawyers would say.87 On the other
hand, these ordinances were mostly enacted before the widespread craze for SUVs, particularly
the gigantic subgenre of vehicles that weigh as much as commercial trucks. The drafters of the
ordinances probably did not intend to target vehicles that are owned primarily for personal use.
Moreover, the law is generally quite lenient on SUVs, granting their owners special tax breaks
and their manufacturers exemptions from passenger car fuel economy standards.88 Thus, one
could plausibly argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the ordinance would not apply to
SUVs.

What is critical in hard cases is that the judge argue for A or B on the basis of what might
be called “internal” legal reasons, and do so in a way that is respectful of the role of law.89 In
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See And y Bo wers, California’s SUV Ban, S LATE (Aug. 4, 2004), <http://slate.msn.com/id/2104755>
(visited 8/4/04).
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See Heydon’s Case, [1584] 76 E.R. at 638.
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See Unio n of Concerned Scientists, Tax Incentives: SUV Loophole Widens, Clean Vehicle Credits Face
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In fairness to Hart and Sacks, they recognize the problem of indeterminacy: “It may even be said that
more than o ne answer is permissible, in the sense that if one answer had b een conscientiously reached an d generally
accepted a reviewing court might well think it ought not to be upset , even though its own answer would have been
different as an original matter.” H ART & S ACKS , supra note _ __, at 149 . Fairly or not, however, The L egal P rocess
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order to respect the rule of law, these justifications must be based on reasons that could be
advanced publicly in an adversarial process in which reasons are given in support of one’s
position.90 It is not necessary that all interpreters agree on the result, as long as the result is
justifiable in principle on the basis of internal legal reasons. Internal legal reasons are simply
those grounds (texts, principles that are fairly deemed to underlie and justify legal rules,
interpretive practices, hermeneutic methods, and so on) that are properly regarded in a
professional community as appropriate reasons to offer in justification of a result. In the SUV
case, the arguments back and forth were offered on the basis of reasons such as the underlying
policies (reducing wear and tear on streets), traditional canons of statutory construction (the
mischief rule), and interpretive practices that place a single text in a broader legal context
(observing the solicitude for SUVs in environmental and tax law). Perhaps it is most natural to
define internal legal reasons negatively, as excluding extraneous factors such as a bribe, gratitude
for a party’s support in a judicial election, information excluded by evidentiary rules, the flip of a
coin, or what the judge ate for breakfast.91 Providing a positive definition of internal legal
reasons is a major task of analytic jurisprudence, and the following Section considers how
seemingly esoteric academic debates can actually have a great deal of practical significance for

do not subscribe to the interpretation of Hart and Sacks that assumes a single purpose lying behind a regime of legal
rules and stand ards.
90

See M ICHA EL I GNA TIEFF, T HE L ESSER E VIL : P OLITICAL E T H IC S IN A N A GE OF T E R RO R 49-53 (2004)
(arguing that the rule of law does not require invariance, but does require public justification).
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how lawyers understand their role in relation to the law.

Before moving on to that discussion, however, it is necessary to consider a seeming
inconsistency between the demands of professionalism in litigation, on the one hand, and
transactional and counseling contexts, on the other. In an easy case, a lawyer is not justified in
urging a court to adopt a spurious interpretation of law; neither is she permitted to structure a
transaction in order to take advantage of an illegitimate construction of applicable legal rules.
The law governing lawyers — both the state bar disciplinary rules and the law of civil procedure
— prohibits advancing frivolous legal arguments.92 In a hard case, however, it appears to be an
implication of professionalism that a lawyer may advocate for an interpretation in litigation that
she would be prohibited from adopting as the basis for legal advice to a client or the structure of
a transaction. This contextual distinction does exist in the law of lawyering, most notably in the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulations implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley act, which
require lawyers in some cases to report information “up the ladder” within a corporation where
they reasonably believe their client is committing certain wrongful acts, but do not require
reporting up where the lawyer is representing the client in litigation over the wrongful act.93 The
distinction may nevertheless be incoherent if it amounts to a requirement that the lawyer assert,
in litigation, an interpretation of the law that she would be prohibited from relying upon in
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See M OD EL R ULES , supra note _ __, R ule 3.1 ; R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF THE L A W G OVERNING L AWYERS
§ 11 0 (2000 ); F ED . R. C IV . P. 11.
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with 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(7)(ii) (no duty to report up where lawyer retained “[t]o assert, consistent with his or her
professional obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer . . . in any investigation or judicial or
administrative proceeding relating to such evidence of a material violation”).
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transactional representation.94

It is important to note that the distinction between the transactional and litigation contexts
is not some kind of ontological or epistemological claim that the law is actually different in these
contexts or it may more easily be recovered in one setting than the other. The applicable law and
the process of interpretation are the same in both settings. The difference is, in hard cases, the
responsibility to serve as a custodian of the law is primarily the judge’s, with limited coordinate
duties on lawyers not to advance frivolous legal arguments, fail to disclose adverse legal
authority missed by the adversary, falsify evidence, or permit perjury to taint the record.95 The
lawyer is justified in advancing an aggressive or novel interpretation of law in litigation, as long
as there is some good faith basis for the argument, because the judge is always in a position to
reject it. Transactional and planning situations are distinctive precisely for the lack of an
impartial referee to push back on the lawyer’s client-centered construction of the law. The
lawyer is the sole legal interpreter and is therefore, in effect, a law-giver from the client’s point of
view. As such, the lawyer has the power to shape the law for good or for ill. As Spider-Man
would observe, with great power comes great responsibility, for if the lawyer does not in some
sense internalize the judicial virtues of impartiality and objectivity, the law will be distorted by
partisan zeal in a context where no neutral third party can check this tendency. In litigation, the
lawyer’s partisan stance and greater flexibility to advance aggressive or novel interpretations of
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For these litigation-related duties, see M OD EL R ULES , supra note ___, Rules 3.1 (frivolous legal
arguments), 3.3(a)(1), (3) (perjury), 3.3(a)(2) (adverse legal authority), 3.4(b) (falsifying evidence).
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legal rules creates flexibility and adaptivity in the law. If similar interpretive license were
permitted in transactional work, however, the legal system would lose some of the virtues
identified with the rule of law, such as stability, predictability, and certainty. Legal theory must
always balance the need for growth and change with the values of stability and resistance to
manipulation. The distinction between transactional and litigation-related representation is one
way to strike this balance.

III.

Arguments for Professionalism.

A.

Identification and Interpretation of Legal Norms.

I have been defending the view that the social function of law is the settlement of uncertainty and
normative conflict, and this requires a system of legal norms that can be identified without
reference to the truth of moral beliefs. This is an argument about the nature of law. Even if one
accepts this account of the nature of law, however, there can be further controversy over the law
in a given case.96 The law on a particular issue must be sufficiently determinate that the matter
may be resolved by reference to the law, rather than any of the reasons that were at stake in the
underlying normative disagreement. The question of the identity of the law, as opposed to the
nature of law, is case-specific and interpretive. It can be stated concisely in one of the following

96

See H.L.A. Hart, Postscript, in H ART , supra note _ __, at 237 , 247 -48 [hereinafter, “Ha rt, Postscript”],
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which version of a given proposal, has been enacted.” W A LD R O N , supra note ___, at 39.
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ways: “What does it mean to say that a proposition of law is true?”97 or “With respect to some
action, is it legally permitted?” The controversy about the law can also be understood in terms of
criteria for the objectivity of legal decisions. If a judge decides that there is a constitutional right
to same-sex marriage, or to obtain an abortion, or to use marijuana for the purpose of alleviating
pain, the question naturally arises whether the decision is just the judge’s subjective belief about
what the law ought to be, or whether it is in fact an accurate report on what the law is, or at least
a defensible judgment where the legal issue could have more than one plausible resolution.98
Most attempts to understand the nature of objectivity in legal reasoning have addressed
themselves to the predicament of a judge who must decide a case, or a critic of a judicial
decision.99 If with respect to an interpretive question in law, there is an objective or determinate
right answer, range of plausible right answers, or at least a wrong answer, then it is possible to
criticize the judge from the standpoint of law, for making a mistake. If there is no such thing as
objectivity or determinacy in law, however, the law does not provide a standpoint for criticizing
the judge.

Lawyers, too, must worry about whether legal interpretation can be objective or
determinate, because when they act in a representative capacity, they enable or limit their clients’
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enjoyment of legal entitlements.100 If a client has a legal right to disinherit his son for opposing
the war in Vietnam,101 but his lawyer refuses to draft a will with this effect because of her moral
disagreement with the client’s desire, the lawyer has blocked the client’s enjoyment of a right
that the legal system would recognize if asserted — namely, the right to cut his son out of his
inheritance. The client may be able to find another lawyer to draft the will, but regardless of
whether the client eventually gets his wish, one could ask whether the original lawyer acted
wrongly vis-à-vis the client’s legal entitlement. The first step in that analysis would be to
ascertain the content of the law of wills. Apparently in Louisiana a parent can disinherit a child
only for one of ten enumerated “just causes,” which must be set forth specifically in the will.102
Unless the hypothetical occurred in Louisiana, however, the testator’s freedom is virtually
unrestricted, except by pretermitted heir statutes, which require the intent to disinherit the son to
be expressly stated in the will.103 In one of those states, the lawyer may believe her refusal to
cooperate with the client to be morally justified, and she may further believe that her moral
obligation not to assist the client outweighs her moral obligation to obey the law, but as long as
she is a competent lawyer she will not deny that the governing law would have permitted the
client to disinherit his son.
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AND

E STATES § 3.6 (1988).

This is obviously an exceptionally simple example,104 but it illustrates what is at stake for
lawyers in the attempt to characterize objectivity in legal interpretation: If the objectively correct
interpretation of an applicable legal norms is that the client has a right to do X, then the lawyer in
an existing lawyer-client relationship must justify her refusal to assist the client in doing X in
moral terms. On the other hand, if one cannot say objectively that legal norms permit the client
to do X, then the lawyer has no burden to justify her refusal morally — she can appeal instead to
an interpretation of the law. Notice that the will example assumes the lawyer is motivated not to
assist her client. The possibility that law is indeterminate creates a different, but equally serious
ethical problem if the lawyer is motivated to do anything at all for her (presumably high-paying)
client. If one cannot say objectively that the client is not legally entitled to do Y, and Y is a
socially harmful thing to do, then the client doing Y may cause a significant amount of harm with
the assistance of a lawyer, and there is no legal standpoint from which we can criticize the lawyer
for helping the client do Y. The latter scenario is the conceptual problem at the heart of the
Enron collapse — we may or may not have good grounds to criticize the lawyers, from the
standpoint of legal interpretation, for their role in setting up the questionable transactions.

In order to determine whether the Enron lawyers are subject to criticism from the point of
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view of the law, we must first determine what the law is with respect to these transactions.
Unlike a simple example like the railroad hypothetical, ascertaining the law in this case is not a
matter of reading unambiguous statutory language and applying the rule it announces to a case
within the core of the statute’s plain meaning. 105 Finding the relevant rule is a much more
complicated interpretive exercise in most cases, because of familiar problems with the use of
verbally formulated rules to guide conduct. In Hart’s well known formulation, legal rules have
an “open texture.”106 Rules do not determine the scope of their own application, but there must
always be something (another rule perhaps, or a conventional practice in the relevant community)
which picks out the instances of some phenomenon which fall under the rule.107 It is tempting to
respond that a legal judgment is objectively true if it corresponds with something “out there,”
like “what the law really is” in a particular case. In general, correspondence theories of truth are
widely believed to be fatally flawed, for a number of reasons, one of which is particularly
relevant to the attempt to use correspondence as a criterion for legal objectivity. 108 Suppose we
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IN T H E

wish to know whether the sentence “the cat is on the mat” is true. The correspondence theory of
truth says it is true if the sentence p (“the cat is on the mat”) corresponds to a state of affairs in
the world W (cat on mat), in some kind of appropriate correspondence-relationship C, whatever
that may be. Schematically, we can represent this truth condition as pCW. Now, have we got it
right? Does p correspond to W in the right way? This is to ask the question whether pCW itself
is true, which suggests there may be some property of the world WN to which pCW may or may
not correspond. So pCW is true if pCWCWN. Then it is open for us to ask whether pCWCWN is
true. We are thus faced with an infinite regress, in which there is no foundational fact-andcorrespondence relationship about which we cannot in principle ask whether it is true.
Something else must serve as criteria of truth, such as correspondence with other beliefs, or a
normative community practice of manifesting agreement with the speaker who utters “there is a
cat on the mat” under certain conditions.109

In legal reasoning, if there is any vagueness, open-texture, or uncertainty in the law,
however, it is an open question whether the judgment corresponds to the law as it is. The
sentence “the judgment corresponds to the law” is itself contestable, and the attempt to specify
truth conditions for that sentence leads us down the same path of infinite regress. In other words,
the correspondence relationship is impossible to pin down using only the concept of
correspondence. Something else is needed to give genuine content to the notion of a truthmaking relationship between an interpretation, on the one hand, and legal texts, practices, and
conventions, on the other. Figuring out the nature of that “something else” has been a major
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preoccupation of analytic jurisprudence. It is certainly an issue that arises in connection with the
argument for professionalism, because a lawyer who adheres to the Holmesian bad man position
would deny the status of “law” to the considerations I claim should be relevant to legal
interpretation by transactional lawyers.

In jurisprudential terms, the problem can be stated in terms of Hart’s concept of a rule of
recognition. In Hart’s account, a legal system is “mature” rather than “primitive” to the extent it
is characterized by a union of primary and secondary rules.110 Primary rules impose obligations,
create rights or permissions, and in other ways guide the day-to-day activities of citizens.
Secondary rules, by contrast, are rules respecting what can be done with primary rules — they
provide for orderly, formal change in primary rules, permit adjudication of disputes that arise
under primary rules, and so on. The most important of these secondary rules, which is essential
to the concept of a legal system, is a rule which provides binding criteria for legal officials who
must identify primary rules in order to interpret and apply the law. This is the rule of
recognition.111 The structure described by Hart gives rise to a paradox, however, because the rule
of recognition cannot depend for its validity on any other rule; otherwise the infinite regress
problem would recur.112 His ingenious solution is to deny that there are legal rules or other
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norms that require officials to follow the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition, instead,
comes into existence because it is practiced, in the sense that officials regard it as a standard for
critically evaluating their own and others’ conduct.113 The convergence by officials on a standard
for identifying legal norms, and the internal attitude that officials take toward the rule as a reason
for action, are the criteria for legality, not any further rule whose credentials as a legal rule would
themselves stand in need of certification by the rule of recognition.

Because it is a product of conventional behavior by officials and the attitude of
acceptance of the rule as a guide to conduct, the rule of recognition need not be formally
expressed as a rule, or written down in any authoritative legal document.114 Thus, one might
wonder whether legal judgments can be objective, if they have no foundation other than social
practices. Specifically in regard to this Article, one might wonder whether the interpretive stance
of professionalism is validated as a legal standard by the applicable rule of recognition, whether
it is just my subjective policy preference or, as a third possibility, whether it is an objectively
binding principle of legal interpretation that is not validated by the rule of recognition. It is
important at this juncture not to overstate the requirements for a judgment to be objective. Even
a strong conception of objectivity need not require something like Platonic forms or
correspondence with the fabric of the universe to underwrite the truth of a proposition. Rather,
objectivity in law need be only moderately domain-specific, meaning that the characteristics of as

113

Id. at 154; H ART , supra note _ __, at 116 -17; R onald Dworkin, The M odel of Rules II, in T AKING R IGHTS
S ERIO US LY 46, 4 9 (1977 ) [hereinafter, “D workin, Mod el II”].
114

H ART , supra note ___, at 101-03,

50

an objective judgment in the natural sciences will differ in some respects from that which makes
a judgment objective in art criticism, basketball officiating, or faculty hiring decisions.115 An
objective judgment in any endeavor must have certain characteristics: (1) independence from the
subjectivity of the judging subject, openness to the subject matter, and willingness to base
judgments on the subject itself, not personal idiosyncracies; (2) amenability to evaluation of the
correctness of judgments, or standards for assessing judgments; and (3) invariance across judging
subjects.116 A decision to follow norm that is capable of serving as a Hartian rule of recognition
satisfies these criteria — in Hart’s words a political official “manifests acceptance” of the rule of
recognition,117 acknowledging that whether a norm counts as a rule of recognition is independent
of the subjectivity of the official. The official also acknowledges that the rule of recognition is a
product of the shared acceptance of the norm, which indicates acceptance of standards for
evaluating the correctness of this judgment. Finally, there must be a high degree of invariance in
officials’ acceptance of the norm, or there would be a general collapse in the efficacy of the legal
system.118 As Hart recognized, there may be some disagreement at the margins of a rule of
recognition, but as long as there is a “normally concordant” practice of identifying law with
reference to certain criteria, one exists.119
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For Hart, whether a rule of recognition exists is an empirical question.120 The content of
the rule of recognition is an empirical question as well.121 One can ascertain the existence and
content of a rule of recognition by reading cases, doing legal sociology, or some other method
appropriate to discovering facts about a community’s practices. The argument in this Section
might be restated in these terms, as a claim that the prescribed attitude of professionalism is in
fact law, and that this fact can be proven by studying the interpretive practices of lawyers and
judges in a number of related areas. In a different vein, one might make a critical or normative
argument about the rule of recognition — namely, that it ought to recognize a principle or
standard as a part of the law. The normative argument in this case would maintain that the legal
system would be better if the attitude of professionalism were a feature of the law, not an
aspiration for lawyers or an obligation of ordinary morality.

B.

Descriptive Arguments: The Case of Tax Shelters.

Interpretive practices by judges, lawyers, legislators, and scholars frequently make
reference to principles to justify a conclusion that X is a true proposition of law. In contrast with
rules, which have a binary, all-or-nothing character,122 principles are characterized by being
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reasons in support of a judge’s decision, but not conclusive reasons in the way that rules are.
Two principles can conflict, and one can outweigh another, while both remain parts of the legal
system; by contrast, when two rules conflict, one of the rules must persist while the other is
abandoned.123 Principles in the Dworkinian sense are not the kind of extra-legal moral arguments
that one might make to criticize the law for being wrongheaded; rather, they exist within the law
and can serve as a link in the chain of an internal justificatory argument.124 Because they are part
of the law, lawyers can no more ignore these principles than they can omit express statutory or
common-law rules from their reasoning process.125 In addition, lawyers appeal to extra-legal
norms constraining their interpretive activities. These are not Dworkinian principles in the sense
of being part of the law itself, but are an aspect of an attitude of respect adopted toward the law
and legal interpretation. “[I]n most contexts lawyers can fairly readily tell the difference between
making good-faith efforts to comply with a plausible interpretation of the purposes of a legal
regime, and using every ingenuity of his or her trade to resist or evade compliance.”126 Indeed,
these extra-legal norms regulating interpretation must be outside the domain of substantive legal
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rules and principles, because any substantive legal norm, whether a rule or a principle, will stand
in need of interpretation and the process of interpretation must be constrained by some sort of
regulative norms. These extra-legal regulative norms are what I have been calling attitudes or
stances taken by officials, and quasi-officials such as lawyers, toward the law.

The opposing argument from the Holmesian bad man perspective is that a lawyer need
not counsel and assist the client within the bounds of law as defined by “good faith efforts” and
“plausible” interpretations — rather, the lawyer need only respect “arguable” or “non-frivolous”
constructions of legal norms.127 Which of these interpretive stances is the right one to take
toward legal norms? One way to answer this question is to see whether courts require clients to
arrange their affairs to comply with the law interpreted in light of substantive principles, values,
and social interests. Once we frame the question in these terms, we can derive support for the
attitude of professionalism from a number of analogous areas of law. Although there are
numerous examples that could be offered, including the law of frivolous litigation128 and the
implicit norms of good faith dealing observed in various commercial communities,129 I will
concentrate on the economic substance doctrine in the law of taxation.
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One of the recurring problems in the law of taxation is that the tax laws may be defeated
through manipulation, that is, by structuring transactions in a way that creates artificial tax
consequences.130 The difficult analytical question is obviously how to define “manipulation” or
“artificial,” and this question only arises because it is possible for a transaction to comply with
formal legal norms while somehow failing to satisfy the substantive standards or principles that
those formal norms attempt to express. The difficulty is perhaps particularly acute in tax law,
which supposedly does not concern itself with whether the taxpayers intent in entering into a
transaction was to avoid taxes,131 but it must be faced in any complex regulatory arena in which a
client may seek the assistance of a lawyer to avoid a legal prohibition or penalty through careful
planning. The danger of manipulation results from the familiar dichotomy between form and
substance, or rules and standards, in legal norms.132 Briefly, the distinction depends on the
conceptual possibility of divergence between the action mandated (or prohibited) by a rule and
the action mandated (or prohibited) by the rule’s background justification.133 A legal norm in the
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form of a rule permitting only people age 16 or older to obtain a driver’s license is plainly
justified by reasons of public safety, but the is both overinclusive and underinclusive with respect
to this background justification. The rule may prevent mature, careful 15 year-olds from driving
(overinclusiveness) as well as permitting reckless, dangerous 20 year-olds to obtain a license
(underinclusiveness). One response to this problem is to permit a decisionmaker to rely directly
on the background justification, by casting the norm in the form of a standard. In our example,
the relevant norm expressed as a standard might be that only competent, mature drivers may
obtain a license.

The distinction between rules and standards creates two sets of mirror-image risks facing
the regulator. Expressing a norm in a standard-like way entails the loss of benefits associated
with rules, such as ease of application, error reduction, constraint on the decisionmaker’s
discretion (and therefore power), and especially values of ex ante predictability and certainty of
application.134 By contrast, expressing the norm in a rule-like way entails the loss of the benefits
associated with standards, such as sensitivity to the fit between the outcome of the legal decision
and the background justification of the norm, and greater ex post contextualization and
particularization of the result, resulting in a more just result as between the parties. In tax law,
rules are generally favored for the additional reason that many transactions are structured
carefully in order to capture tax benefits, even if the tax treatment of the given transaction was
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never foreseen or intended.135 Given the sensitivity of transactional structure to tax
consequences, there seems to be a heightened need for predictability in tax law as opposed to,
say, tort law, where many actors are less likely to be influenced by the precise form of legal
norms. Still, there must be limits on the extent to which the formal (or rule-based) treatment of a
transaction can diverge from the substantive (or standard-based) approach — too great a
divergence and the system will be unfair as between similarly situated taxpayers.136 There is
accordingly great pressure to differentiate between real transactions, undertaken in the ordinary
course of a taxpayer’s business for legitimate business purposes, and the artificial transactions,
with all their Rube Goldberg complexity, set up with no purpose other than to generate tax
benefits.

One way to distinguish between real and artificial transactions and their tax consequences
is to rely on the informed judgment of members of the relevant professional community. As
Mark Gergen observes, “[g]ood tax lawyers know when they are pushing hard at the edge of the
envelope.”137 After observing the difficulty in arriving at determinate standards of tax motive
and economic substance, which would enable courts to deny a positive result to a taxpayer who
had complied formally with the rules, he falls back on professional judgment to formulate a
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“disclaimer” that could be attached to any analysis of form and substance in tax law:

A determination that an action is tax motivated or insubstantial is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for denying a positive tax result to which the
actor claims he is entitled under tax law. There may be other grounds for rejecting
the actor’s position. These standards do not displace other forms of reasoning.
Further, some tax motivated or insubstantial actions are respected. As for which
are respected and which are not, that is difficult to say. Do not always expect to
find a rule or principle to sort them out. In a novel case the best guide may well
be professional common knowledge.138

Similarly, tax lawyer Peter Canellos claims that everyone in the relevant community knows the
difference between creative tax planning and bogus tax shelters, even though shelters are
designed to mimic real transactions.139 In tax sheltering, “promoters attempt to apply a patina of
substance to a transaction that is formal and unreal,” while legitimate tax practitioners plan real
business transactions with a business purpose, in light of the possibility of obtaining tax
advantages.”140 As Canellos recognizes, all of these terms are subject to a challenge that they be
defined more precisely — what makes a transaction real or unreal? what is the difference
between a patina of substance and creative structuring? The answers cannot be given by ever
more elaborate rules, however. Professional judgment is an irreducible aspect of the analysis,
even though it may be possible to set out some standards or criteria that are germane to the
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exercise of judgment.141

Appeals to professional judgment lead to a predictable reaction — charges of
unprincipled decisionmaking, arbitrariness, non-transparency, and a departure from the ideal of
objectivity in law.142 Critics are apt to cite, disparagingly, Justice Stewart’s comment about hardcore pornography, that he cannot define it, but he knows it when he sees it.143 But recall the
previous discussion of judgment and objectivity. A judgment in this domain (e.g. “that is a tax
shelter, not a legitimate transaction”) can be objective as long as the decisionmaker is willing to
base judgments on the subject itself, not personal idiosyncracies; is willing to be open to
evaluation of the correctness of her judgment; and makes a decision that exhibits some degree of
invariance across judging subjects.144 This kind of limited domain-specific objectivity can be
secured by constraining all-things-considered contextual judgments with more specific criteria
which are developed over a series of analogous cases. In the tax example, the taxpayer will not
be denied tax benefits as long as the transaction has a legitimate business purpose. This standard
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can be defined further based on criteria such as:

C

the way the transaction was marketed and sold — i.e. whether it was pitched by
specialized tax professionals and marketed to the tax or finance department of a
corporation, or was it developed by outside investment advisors or internal operations
departments and marketed in terms of business or financing opportunities, not tax
savings;

C

the involvement of real or extraneous parties — i.e. whether it included real buyers and
sellers, with financing at market rates, or accommodation parties such as foreign
subsidiaries or partnerships;

C

the use of a series of highly choreographed steps; and

C

whether the workings of the transaction are concealed (and thus reliant upon the audit
lottery) or publicly disclosed.145

Assuming that these evaluative criteria are generally shared within the relevant community, the
judgment of legitimate business purpose is sufficiently objective.

It is my belief that criteria similar to those for economic substance in taxation could be
developed in any area of practice, in consultation with specialists in the substantive law, and it is
my contention that the professionalism demands that lawyers understand their counseling and
advising role as mandating the use of criteria such as these. My principal aim in this Article is
not to generate specific criteria, like the ones above for identifying abusive tax planning, but to
lay the jurisprudential groundwork for the prescription that lawyers ought to think about their
roles in this way. The task of developing criteria for the exercise of judgment would then be a
task for conscientious lawyers in various areas of practice. Up to this point, however, the
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arguments have been descriptive only, insofar as they have shown that in at least one area of law,
it is possible to conceptualize practice in accordance with the professionalism. The task for the
following subsection is to demonstrate that this style of practice is mandatory.

I am hedging here a bit with the term “relevant” community. Canellos’s article on tax
shelters identifies two vastly different communities of practitioners — the tax bar and the tax
shelter bar.146 “Real” tax practitioners structure transactions that are otherwise legitimate in a
way that maximizes tax advantages; they are concerned with their reputation and status, and
often become involved with high-profile organizations such as the tax sections of the ABA and
the New York State Bar Association, which are dedicated to improving the tax law. They
consider exercising professional judgment as a stock in trade. (This description, particularly the
elitism and emphasis on the exercise of judgment, calls to mind Anthony Kronman’s lawyerstatesman.147) Tax shelter practitioners, on the other hand, set up artificially contrived deals, care
little about their reputation for probity and judgment, and provide legal opinions as a fig leaf for
sheltering transactions that are widely derided as flimflam by real practitioners. So which of
these is the relevant community? If we specific real tax practitioners and then derive evaluative
criteria from their shared norms, are we not engaging in circular reasoning? The shared norms of
the tax shelter bar and the criteria they would generate for identifying abusive transactions would
presumably look very different from those listed above. But why follow the interpretive
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principles of the tax bar, not the tax shelter bar? Or, why regard oneself as a member of the
interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to those norms? In theory, a lawyer may
decide to remove herself from the tax bar and join the tax shelter bar, which recognizes a
different set of standards of interpretation.148 Even if the authority of a community’s disciplining
rules do not depend on assent to those norms,149 it seems open to practitioners to opt out of the
community and opt into a different community, with a different set of disciplining rules.150

A different way to frame this objection might be to claim that the requirement of
professionalism in interpretation only gains authority by bootstrapping. That is, my claim is that
the obligation imposed by the attitude of professionalism is a function of the relevant interpretive
community and the standards it recognizes for evaluating the correctness of legal judgments (i.e.
“although purely formal norms seem to permit X, the law as correctly interpreted prohibits X”).
At the same time, I seem to be claiming that a lawyer ought to associate himself with the
interpretive community that recognizes the attitude of professionalism and shun other
communities that do not. What is the source of this meta-obligation? If the response were, “the
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obligation of professionalism,” that would indeed be bootstrapping. But the correct response is
given instead in terms of the social function of law: A relatively stable, determinate framework
of legal rights and obligations is necessary to permit ordered cooperation among people who
disagree on just about everything except the need to reach settlement of disagreements. If
lawyers were permitted to adopt a Holmesian bad man interpretive attitude (or to opt into a
community which recognized that attitude as a proper interpretation of the relevant law), then the
law would end up having no boundaries at all, no constraining capacity, and therefore no ability
to create authoritative settlement. This conclusion may sound unduly apocalyptic, but experience
with practices such as tax sheltering shows that lawyers can always plan around formal legal
norms, given sufficient resources and creativity. Purely formal constraints such as legislation,
rulemaking, and enhanced enforcement will never be sufficient to eliminate abuses because
lawyers are involved in constructing the bounds of the law.151 As Robert Gordon rightly
observes, there are resources for strategic manipulation within any set of adjudicative or
administrative rules and procedures.152 As a result, the effectiveness of the law depends on
constraints that are exogenous to formal legal norms. The following Subsection develops this
argument further.

Before moving on, however, it is necessary to consider one final objection.153 I have been
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talking about “the community” and its interpretive practices as if it were a thing to which an
intention can be straightforwardly ascribed. In one sense, this is just a convenient fiction —
communities don’t have practices or disciplining rules, community members follow these norms.
The community’s standards can be located by observing convergent behavior by community
members,154 but the community itself is not an intentional being. On the other hand we speak
quite naturally of collective intentions and norms and attribute these mental states to a group.155
In this case, we mean literally that the group intends something and are no longer using collective
intention as a metaphor. Moreover, we do so even in the absence of some formal procedure,
such as taking a poll, which we could use to discern the intentions of individuals and aggregate
them into a collective intention. Without formal procedures we may reach a premature and
incorrect conclusion about the group’s intention,156 so an ascription of group intention must be
regarded as potentially revisable, but talking as though the group has an intention is not
incoherent. In the example here, it may turn out that the elite tax bar is more tolerant of tax
shelters than its more outspoken members would admit. This, however, is an empirical challenge
to the norms of a particular group, not a conceptual impediment to the general practice of
imputing intentions to a collective body.

C.

Normative Arguments: Public Justifiability.
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Descriptive arguments cannot settle with finality the question of whether the attitude of
professionalism is a part of our legal system. One could read every case and conduct exhaustive
empirical sociological research and never know the answer for sure. There are two reasons for
this. The first is that the rule of recognition, like any legal rule, is characterized by its open
texture.157 There may be a situation in which there is factual uncertainty regarding the content of
the rule of recognition, and in that situation some institution will be called upon to make an
unconstrained choice about the specific contours of the ultimate rule for identifying law. There
are no rules requiring one result or another — as Hart puts it, “at the fringe of these very
fundamental things, we should welcome the rule-sceptic.”158 The second is the by-now familiar
infinite regress problem. No amount of rules and meta-rules can settle an interpretive question
with finality. Hart grounded the rule of recognition in social practices to avoid the regress
problem, and we might take the same way out with respect to professionalism. A more
promising approach, however, would be to give an extra-legal justification for it — one which is
based on the nature and function of law, and therefore the reasons for treating legal directives as
authoritative.

Philosophers of law ask the conceptual question “what distinguishes law from other
means of social ordering?”159 for a reason — the function of law is to do a distinctive kind of
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work, as compared with other means of securing social order. My claim has been that the
function of law is to secure the conditions necessary for cooperation and the realization of
collective goods, notwithstanding deep and persistent disagreement over values, ends,
conceptions of the good, and the application of moral principles to practical situations. In order
to do this work, law must have certain characteristics. It is tempting to say that the law must be
uncontroversial,160 but in anything outside the core of the application of legal norms, common
experience shows that the law is anything but uncontroversial. In any event, the requirement that
the law be uncontroversial is usually interpreted as a requirement that a legal system’s rule of
recognition be capable of formulation without reference to the content of moral principles, and
this requirement does not preclude the use in legal reasoning of moral principles that have
become incorporated into legal norms.161 Preclusion of the content of moral norms is necessary
to avoid slipping back into the disagreement that required authoritative settlement by law. But
the preclusion of non-legal considerations that is the consequence of the negative aspect of
professionalism requires a lawyer to exclude moral principles from her interpretive process only
to the extent those principles are not recognized as part of law by the relevant interpretive
community. In addition, the positive aspect of professionalism requires that a lawyer’s
interpretive judgment be guided, in the end, by the social function of law, which is to provide a
secure framework for coordinated action. For this reason, interpretive communities have
evolved, and ought to evolve, higher-order standards for differentiating artificial, abusive
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transactions that comply only formally with legal rules from those transactions that comply
substantially with the law.

The reason to favor the interpretive principles of the tax bar, instead of the tax shelter bar,
is that the former does better vis-à-vis the social function of the law. The choice of that
community’s norms is not an aesthetic response or a standardless attempt to privilege one
standpoint over another. Rather, the foundational question — which community’s norms? — is
answered with reference to purposive or teleological standards. The analogy in moral philosophy
is Aristotelian virtue ethics, in which character, virtue, and the exercise of judgment (practical
wisdom, or phronesis) are prior to evaluations of right and wrong, and moral virtues are known
to be virtues because they conduce to the final good for humans, eudaimonia.162 As long as there
is agreement on the final end of an activity or practice, it is possible to define virtues as those
characteristics that enable one to better realize the ends of that practice.163 Kripke’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein makes a similar point in a different way, noting that for utterances to be said to
conform to a rule, they must not only conform to assertability conditions, but also that there is
some point, within the community of language-users, of making this type of utterance under
these conditions.164
162
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Thus, the reasons for regarding the law as authoritative over some issue gives a reason for
incorporating the interpretive understandings of a particular community. These principles in turn
can supply criteria for differentiating legitimate from bogus interpretations of formal legal norms.
The reason for treating the law as authoritative is that it does a better job than uncoordinated
individual action at facilitating peaceful social interaction and cooperation against a background
of persistent conflict and disagreement. In order for the law to facilitate private ordering,
however, it must be relatively stable and determinate; and in order for law to be stable and
determinate, the lawyers who interpret and apply the law to their clients’ situations must interpret
the law in a way that reflects the public meaning it would likely have if interpreted by a legal
official such as a judge or administrative law judge.165 This means that a lawyer cannot interpret
the law applying to complex, undisclosed transactions differently, merely because the
transactions are secret; the appropriate normative stance one must take toward the law assumes
that the facts of the transaction are being evaluated by a competent regulator who is fully
informed on the applicable facts and law.

I suppose a lawyer could reply that she is unconcerned with the effective functioning of
the law, which is a problem for legislators, rulemakers, or judges, but not for her or her client. If
those “others” were unable to make the law fully effective, so much the worse for them, but it is
of no moment to the lawyer or her client. This attitude, however, would be self-defeating —
even irrational in the narrow means-ends sense. Again picking up on an argument by Robert
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Gordon, the response to this lawyer is that she must be concerned about the effective functioning
of the law, because without it, neither she nor her client could realize her own interests. The
market economy presupposes a background of stable law, custom, and enforcement that enforces
private ordering. 166 Even if a lawyer and client were concerned only with pursuing their own
narrow self-interest, paradoxically it is only possible to behave self-interestedly within a
framework of other-regarding obligations. A lawyer might evade regulatory requirements by
aggressive structuring of transactions in one case, but cause long-run damage in the form of
eroding the capability of the legal system to facilitate the functioning of financial markets. The
lawyer cannot be indifferent to this long-term damage and still claim to be making an ethical
argument about the obligations of her role, because it is in the nature of ethical arguments that
they must be generalizable to relevantly similar situations. It may be true that a lawyer could
game the system once without causing catastrophic damage, but this would constitute
impermissible free-riding on the cooperation of others. Thus, any plausible ethical argument —
i.e. one that is worthy of the respect of similarly situated others — must take account of the
consequences of widespread manipulation of formal legal norms.

IV.

The Enron Lawyers: Creative, Aggressive, and Professional, or Creative, Aggressive,
and Unprofessional?

Enron had a problem. It had an ambitious plan for growth that required billions of dollars
in cash, but it could not raise cash through conventional methods like selling stock or borrowing
from banks. The reason was simple — additional borrowing would harm its credit rating and
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issuing additional equity would hurt the price of its stock, which would be unthinkable in a
company driven by the need to constantly increase its share price.167 The markets it had created,
in natural gas and wholesale electricity, were maturing and profits from trading were diminishing
in response to increasing competition.168 Moreover, the insistence by Jeffrey Skilling that the
company use mark-to-market accounting placed tremendous pressure on corporate managers to
show constant revenue growth, even if that meant sacrificing cash flow.169 These incentives
explain the motivation for most of the convoluted transactions devised by Chief Financial Officer
Andy Fastow. Fastow’s innovation, if you can call it that, was to use techniques of structured
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financing and asset securitization to accomplish two principal goals: borrow money while
keeping debt off the books, and enable Enron to book the long-term value of a deal immediately
under mark-to-market accounting rules.170 Significantly, Fastow’s corporate finance department
set up transactions to milk them for beneficial accounting treatment — in terms of the
substantive economics of the business, they did nothing at all. This observation will be crucial to
evaluating the duties of the lawyers who were employed to provide the documentation for the
transactions.

Many of the Fastow transactions have become well known by names such as Chewco,
LJM1 and LJM2, and the Raptors. These names refer to special purpose entities (SPE’s) which
were set up as part of the deals. Special purpose entities are often used in the process of asset
securitization, in which the owners of some asset convert a stream of income over time into
something that could be repackaged as a security and sold immediately to investors in the capital
markets.171 For example, a bank with many outstanding mortgage loans is entitled to receive
monthly payments over the life of those loans, but it may wish to convert those payments into a
lump sum in cash that it can use immediately. To do so, it “bundles” the mortgages and transfers
them to an SPE, which issues tradable financial instruments (mortgage-backed securities),
offered to investors at a discount relative to the present value of the stream of payments. The
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investors make money because they paid less for the securities than the income over time is
worth. The bank is happy because it has converted a formerly illiquid asset into cash. The
investors in these transactions are often investment banks who deal with large corporations on a
regular basis, and in the case of Enron were subjected to a fair amount of bullying by Fastow.172
The banks and other institutional investors would often contribute funds directly to an SPE
created for the deal, which in turn purchased the asset from its owner. In all of these
transactions, the SPE is supposed to be independent of the seller of the assets, but to be deemed
independent, it actually need only have 3 percent of its equity owned by a party unaffiliated with
the seller. (If the SPE is independent, it need not be “consolidated” — i.e. reported on the
financial statements of the company that transferred assets to the SPE.) Thus, if Citibank or J.P.
Morgan contributed $3 million to an SPE and Enron contributed $97 million, Enron would be
permitted to transfer assets to the SPE and book the transaction as a bona fide sale to an
independent party. This situation was very much preferable, from Enron’s perspective, to a $100
million loan from the bank, which would have had an adverse effect on Enron’s credit rating.

Although the legal and accounting requirements for transactions with unconsolidated, offbalance-sheet SPE’s are not terribly rigorous, Enron had a hard time complying even with
those.173 Or, to put it differently, Enron was not interested in consummating a genuine transfer of
assets to a truly independent entity. Its motivation was rather to continue to realize the economic
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benefits of owning the asset, preferably as operating income as opposed to a one-time profits, but
move any debt associated with the acquisition of the asset off its balance sheet.174 In order to
accomplish this goal, Enron officers and employees, with the assistance of accountants and
lawyers, attempted to structure transactions that conformed to the letter of financial accounting
rules, while aggressively pushing the boundaries of permissibility. To return to the image which
opened this Article, the lawyers and accountants were directed to create a duck, even though the
transactions (in more than one sense!) were a dog. The duck-creating rules for SPE transactions
can be summarized very briefly as follows175:

C

The SPE must be “bankruptcy remote” from the originating company (e.g. Enron), so that
the originating company’s credit risks do not affect the risks associated with owning the
securities of the SPE.176

C

Bankruptcy remoteness depends, in turn, on the genuine transfer of the economic risks
and benefits associated with the assets from the originating company to the SPE.177 In
other words, the transfer must be a “true sale.”178
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C

If the SPE is not truly independent (i.e. bankruptcy remote) from the originating
company, the assets and liabilities of the SPE must be consolidated on the financial
statements of the originating company.179 Fleshing out the requirement of independent
ownership, financial accounting standards set a minimum of 3% for the equity that must
be contributed by entities unaffiliated with the originating company.180

C

The independence of an SPE can be compromised by the originating company retaining
conrol over the asset; this can be accomplished through side deals, such as loan
guarantees, between the originating company and the SPE, and may be shown by the
originating company’s attempt to recognize gains in the value of the SPE as earnings on
its own balance sheet.181

Notice, however, that these norms are subject to manipulation or gaming by lawyers who
may be motivated to comply with them only formally. A complete analysis of the
appropriateness of the Enron transactions would have to give additional content to those rules by
tapping into the understandings of the relevant interpretive community, which are germane to the
exercise of interpretive judgment by lawyers and accountants. These principles are relevant to
interpretation, and can constrain the exercise of judgment, but only if the lawyer engaged in the
process of interpretation belongs to a community that is interested in maintaining a stable,
publicly accessible framework for cooperative activity. A lawyer who belongs to Andy Fastow’s
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interpretive community might be interested only in securing short-term economic benefits for her
client or, worse, for an individual agent of her client. As I have argued, however, this
interpretive stance cannot be given a normative justification that reaches all the way down to the
bedrock of the social function of the law. If, on the other hand, a lawyer is interested in
exercising judgment in a way that has plausible ethical foundations, she will probably discover
that the interpretive community recognizes certain norms that differentiate artificially created
ducks from real ducks — that is, distinguishing between transactions that are motivated only by
the attempt to create accounting results and those that have a real economic substance. In
addition to the rules for duck-ness, there are principles regulating interpretation that sort ducks
from dogs dressed up as ducks, including:

C

One of the benefits of SPE financing is “disintermediation,” or the reduction of
transaction costs by removing intermediaries such as banks from the financing process. A
transaction involving multiple intermediaries and a highly complex series of steps is
unlikely to result in the transaction cost savings that usually justifies SPE transactions.182

C

Because SPE transactions can benefit both the originating company and investors in the
SPE, one would expect a legitimate transaction to be fully disclosed in a sufficiently clear
manner. One of the recurring themes of the commentary on the Enron transactions is the
opacity of the disclosures.183 An undisclosed transaction or one that is camouflaged in
layers of obfuscating legalese, should alert lawyers and accountants that something is
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fishy.184
C

Additional caution is warranted when other aspects of the transaction are aggressive. For
example, in the LJM transactions, Enron capitalized the SPE’s with $1.2 billion of its
own common stock, in exchange for notes issued by the SPE’s. This is a once-disfavored
funding mechanism, and GAAP requires that Enron reduce shareholder equity in the
amount of the newly issued shares, until the SPE pays down the notes.185 Use of this kind
of capitalization scheme, and the failure of Enron to account for the transaction properly,
should have put professionals on notice that other aspects of the transaction should be
scrutinized carefully.

C

The financial accounting system in general is intended to provide transparent, accurate,
easily understood information to managers, creditors, and investors regarding the
financial condition of the reporting company.186 If it appears that managers are valuing
complexity for its own sake, it could be a red flag warning lawyers and accountants that
the transaction is intended to manipulate the numbers on the company’s financial
statements, rather than accomplish some economically useful end.

Like the disciplining rules that differentiate between legitimate structuring to capture
favorable tax treatment, on the one hand, and bogus tax shelters on the other, these principles of
interpretation are not binary, all-or-nothing rules. There is no algorithmic way to capture the
process of reasoning from these principles to a correct application of the law to an SPE
transaction. For this reason, there may be hard cases in which competent lawyers disagree over
whether a given transaction is permissible, and there may be cases in which some lawyers are
more aggressive than others in pushing the boundaries of the rules. This is as it should be. To
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emphasize, my claim is not that the appropriately constrained judgment of interpretive
communities produces a single right answer in every case. Rather, the limit on lawyers’
creativity, preventing it from shading over into undue aggressiveness, is the requirement of
public justifiability. A lawyer must be prepared, in principle, to articulate a reason why the legal
treatment (for tax, accounting, bankruptcy, etc., purposes) of a transaction is legitimate, in light
of the end sought to be advanced by the regulatory regime in question. In the case of the Enron
SPE transactions reviewed in the Powers and Batson reports, there is simply no plausible
justification available. Fastow and his confederates had manipulated the techniques of structured
financing to produce spurious accounting results which had no relationship whatsoever to the
underlying economics of the transactions. Their abuse was abetted by the Holmesian bad man
attitudes of lawyers and accountants, who in effect agreed with Fastow that if the rules do not
explicitly say that something may not be done, it is permissible. As this Article has argued,
however, interpreting the law correctly requires an approach very different from asking, “Show
me where it says I can’t do that.”187

187

Cf. Ro man L. W eil, Testimony, Fundamental Causes of the Accounting Debacle at Enron: Show Me
Where It Says I Can ’t, H OUSE E N E R GY A N D C OMM ERCE C OMM ITTEE H E A RIN G (Feb. 6, 2002), available at
<http://gsb.uchicago.edu/pdf/weil_testimony.pdf> (visited 7/16/04).

77

